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Making Appearances Matter:
Recusal and the Appearance of Bias
Dmitry Bam



In the United States, judges are required to recuse themselves—that
is, remove themselves from participating in a case—not only when they
are biased, but even when they may appear biased to a neutral observer.
This nominally strict, appearance-based recusal standard is intended to
ensure the judge’s impartiality in resolving disputes, to protect the
judiciary’s reputation, and to instill public confidence in the fairness of
the courts. It has long been assumed that so long as the judge makes the
correct recusal decision, the appearance of impartiality is restored and
the reputation of the judiciary is protected.
This Article challenges that long-standing assumption and argues
that the focus on appearances only at the time of the recusal decision,
when the public has already formed its impressions of judicial
impartiality, may not fully restore public confidence and protect the
reputation of the judiciary. In other words, a judge’s recusal decision
may be too little and come too late. Moreover, when appearances are
considered on a case-by-case basis, often by the very judge whose
impartiality has been challenged, even the correct nonrecusal decision
does not always foster an appearance of impartiality.
Most of the literature on recusal focuses on the recusal standard and
the reasons why judges might, intentionally or unintentionally, reach
the incorrect recusal decision, and seeks solutions to that problem. In this
Article, I propose a new role that appearances should play in American
recusal jurisprudence, and a new approach to judicial recusal. I argue
that rather than allowing individual judges to consider appearances ex
post (i.e., in the context of individual cases), legislators must consider
appearances ex ante to prevent the damage to the judiciary from
arising in the first instance. This means that legislators must regulate
judicial selection (including judicial elections) and judicial conduct, as
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want to thank Sarah Cravens, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Amanda Packel, and Deborah Rhode
for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to a number of participants at the Fourth
International Legal Ethics Conference for their feedback and critiques.

943

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 1:15 PM

2011

well as extrajudicial conduct, with an eye towards potential future
recusal. To that end, legislatures should create ethical rules and
regulations designed to eliminate any appearance of impartiality from
arising. And, to the extent that recusal cannot be avoided by such ex
ante regulation, legislatures must also consider appearances ex ante in
creating and implementing new recusal procedures.
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Making Appearances Matter
“We may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we
can never see them with any eyes except our own.”
—Judge Benjamin Cardozo1
I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout this nation’s history, Americans have only
sporadically paid close attention—or any attention—to judicial
recusal. Recusal, which in certain circumstances requires a judge to
step aside from hearing a case, is a doctrine that protects (some
would say is crucial to protecting) both judicial impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality. That a judge must be disinterested, and
must appear disinterested, is universally accepted in American legal
culture. But despite the centrality of that notion in Western legal
thought, the attention that recusal receives is often short-lived. The
public temporarily takes notice of the issue when controversy arises,
and in response to public outcry, state and federal legislatures, state
supreme courts, and various bar associations promulgate new rules
and guidelines to govern judicial disqualification or, more often,
revise the rules already in place.2 The issue then fades from the
public’s mind and lays quiescent until the cycle is repeated with a
new high-profile incident.
But the familiar on-again-off-again pattern has been broken in
the last few years as recusal has steadily lingered in the national
spotlight. From the controversy surrounding Justice Scalia’s
infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney,3 to the
recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey,4 to the
more recent outcry over a federal district judge’s decision to
overturn a federal moratorium on deep-sea drilling in the Deepwater

1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).
2. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” are used interchangeably throughout this
Article. These terms originally had slightly different meanings, with “recusal” referring to
withdrawal at the judge’s discretion and “disqualification” meaning exclusion by force of law,
but this distinction is no longer recognized. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In
Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 (1970); see also RICHARD E.
FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8
passim (2d ed. 2007).
3. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
4. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). This case is discussed
in greater detail throughout this Article. The underlying facts in Caperton were the basis for
John Grisham’s best-selling novel The Appeal.
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Horizon controversy,5 to the even more recent debate about
whether a reportedly homosexual federal district court judge should
have recused himself from ruling on the constitutionality of
California’s ban on gay marriage,6 judicial recusal has never been
more in vogue.7 A federal appellate judge once commented that
recusal is the “topic du jour,” and this was before the spate of recent
incidents dramatically shook the foundation of the judicial
disqualification jurisprudence.8 While the aphorism that there is “no
such thing as bad publicity” may be true in many aspects of modern
popular culture, this is not the case when it comes to the judiciary.
As the number of high-profile disqualification controversies
continues to grow, the reputation of our courts is tarnished, and the
public’s faith in judicial impartiality and independence erodes.
There is potentially a silver lining to the cloud of negative
publicity: as more people notice a problem, and it continues to
capture their attention, more people tend to work on a solution.
This has certainly been the case with judicial recusal. The Caperton
decision has sparked, or at the very least rekindled, academic and
political interest in judicial disqualification.9 Following on the heels

5. On June 22, 2010, federal district judge Martin Feldman overturned President
Obama’s moratorium on deep-ocean oil well drilling. The president had imposed the
moratorium in response to the disaster in the gulf that spewed millions of barrels of crude oil
into the Gulf of Mexico each day. It was later discovered that Feldman owns (or owned)
extensive stock in oil companies and oil drilling corporations, including Allis-Chalmers and
Exxon, although the stock appears to have been sold the very day that Judge Feldman issued
his ruling. See Tennille Tracy, Groups Seek Judge’s Removal in Drilling-Moratorium Case,
WALL
ST.
J.,
July
2,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704293604575343361857605650.html.
6. See John C. Eastman, Should Judge Have Recused Himself on Prop. 8?, SFGATE.COM
(Aug. 11, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-08-11/opinion/22213940_1_partiesjudge-walker-new-trial. On June 14, 2011, Judge Ware denied the motion to disqualify Judge
Vaughn Walker. See Howard Mintz, Judge Rejects Bid to Set Aside Proposition 8 Ruling,
MERCURYNEWS.COM (June 14, 2011, 10:09 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/
samesexmarriage/ci_18271537?source=rss&nclick_check.
7. While this Article focuses on recusal rules in the United States, recusal has also
received significant attention overseas. See, e.g., HUGO YOUNG, The Compromising of Lord
Hoffman, in SUPPING WITH THE DEVILS: POLITICAL WRITING FROM THATCHER TO BLAIR
212–14 (2003).
8. M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of
Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005).
9. As of June 21, 2010, a Westlaw search for “Caperton and Massey” yields 172 hits in
the JLR database. Interestingly, a search of the “ALLFEDS” (all federal cases) and
“ALLSTATES” (all state cases) yields only 129 results, suggesting that the academic and
scholarly interest in the case may outweigh its impact on the courts and subsequent litigation.
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of that decision, Congress held hearings examining judicial recusals
in light of Caperton,10 states grappled (and continue to grapple) with
new recusal rules and procedures,11 and law schools around the
country have held conferences and symposia dedicated to Caperton
and judicial ethics writ large.12 But despite this concerted effort, no
large-scale, national disqualification reform looms on the horizon.
The problem seems to be that while many scholars and judges agree
that something must be done, few agree on precisely what that
something should be.13
There is, however, an overwhelming consensus on one point:
When it comes to recusal, the focus is generally on the actual recusal
decision—“What did the judge decide?” and “Was that decision
correct?” In other words, scholars, judges, and politicians have

This casts some doubt on the Caperton dissenters’ prediction that the decision would open the
floodgates for “Caperton motions” and that the courts would be inundated with frivolous
disqualification demands.
10. On December 10, 2010, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
Courts and Competition held a hearing entitled “Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after
Caperton v. A.T. Massey.” This is not the first time in recent years that Congress has paid
attention to judicial recusal. Shortly after the controversy over Justice Scalia’s non-recusal in a
case involving Vice President Dick Cheney, Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee
called for hearings into possible shortcomings of recusal laws that allowed Justice Scalia to hear
a case after vacationing with one of the litigants. Senator Kerry asserted at the time that
“[t]here is absolutely no question that when judges accept vacations and gifts from the parties
before them it erodes public trust in the courts.” Josh Gerstein, Kerry Has Pressed a Long
Campaign to Rein in Judges, N.Y. SUN, July 14, 2004, at 1.
11. West Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin are just a few of the states where
contentious debate regarding the appropriate reaction to Caperton took place. For an article
summarizing reforms in the states following Caperton, see James Sample, Court Reform Enters
the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787 (2010). On June 27, 2011, New York issued
new recusal rules for elected state judges, prohibiting those judges from hearing cases involving
litigants—parties or lawyers—who contributed over $2,500 to their campaigns. See Rules
Governing the Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS § 151.1, available at
http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1.
12. See, e.g., Symposium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215
(2010); Symposium, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 559 (2010); Symposium, Judicial Ethics and Accountability: At Home and Abroad, 42
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2010); Press Release, Georgetown Law School, State Courts and U.S.
Supreme Court Rulings: Will Caperton and Citizens United Change the Way States Pick
Judges? (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/
January.26.2010.html.
13. But see John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to
Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799 (2009) (suggesting that nationallevel reforms to disqualification rules are unnecessary, and that the issue should be left to
individual states).

947

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 1:15 PM

2011

historically concentrated on what I call “getting to recusal,” that is,
creating and amending substantive recusal rules that require partial
judges (whether that partiality is real or perceived) to step aside. And
even though appearances play an important role in the law of judicial
recusal, only at the point of the recusal decision are appearances and
public perception considered. This results-oriented, outcome-based
approach to recusal is not surprising—the final recusal decision is
generally the most salient part of the entire recusal process and one
that figures most prominently in the public spotlight. After all, it was
recusal decisions themselves that generally gave rise to the recusalrelated controversies arising in the last decade. In turn, the focus on
outcomes leads recusal reformers to proceed under a fundamentally
flawed assumption that the problem can be solved by simply
fashioning a new rule requiring a future judge to recuse under the
same factual circumstances that may have led a present-day judge not
to recuse. As a consequence of this assumption, substantive recusal
standards have been continually revised and refined, while recusal
procedures have remained stagnant. Additionally, the same
assumption (i.e., that recusal can eliminate the appearance of
partiality created by the judicial conduct requiring recusal in the first
place) has led scholars and politicians to pay little attention to
regulating the underlying judicial conduct.
In the pages that follow, I argue that this outcome-based
approach is misguided when it comes to maximizing the appearance
of judicial impartiality and judicial legitimacy. Focusing on the final
recusal decision, and considering appearances only at the time of that
decision, places too much emphasis on an aspect of recusal that may
not be so important, at least when it comes to public confidence in
the impartiality and fairness of American courts.
This Article recommends a two-part solution. The first part
requires that attention shift away from the outcome-based recusal
jurisprudence that focuses on the substantive recusal standard and
the actual recusal decision. The second requires that attention shift
toward the rules, regulations, and procedures that precede the
recusal decision: namely, (1) ex ante regulation of judicial conduct
and judicial selection that creates the appearance of bias in the first
place,14 and (2) new recusal procedures to govern the processes by

14. Unlike ex post solutions like judicial recusal, which seek to minimize the damage to
the judiciary by removing judges when they may be perceived as biased, an ex ante solution in
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which judges make recusal decisions. The recommended shift of
attention to ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and appearancebased recusal procedures will promote the appearance of judicial
impartiality.
While at first glance recusal may seem like a narrow and obscure
topic within the larger field of judicial ethics and judicial impartiality,
judicial recusal is a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a
court should be fair and impartial. Partly as a result of a poorly
functioning recusal scheme, public confidence in the legal system has
waned, and people are rightly concerned about the impartiality of
their courts.15 A “crisis of confidence” may be infecting our ideals of
judicial impartiality.16 In light of the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White17 and Citizens
United v. FEC,18 recusal reform may be the best way—perhaps the
only way—to deal with the appearance of partiality that can be
created by large campaign contributions to a judge in the course of
an election.19 As other safeguards of judicial impartiality have fallen
by the wayside or been struck down by the Supreme Court, and as
judicial elections have come to resemble legislative elections, finding
a new approach to recusal becomes more and more crucial.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the history
of judicial recusal in the United States. This history shows the
evolution of American thought about judicial recusal, from its
common-law origins, when disqualification was required only if the
judge had a pecuniary interest in the case, to the regime in place
today, which requires recusal for a mere appearance of bias. I will
also show how substantive recusal standards have evolved under the
this context consists of rules that minimize or eliminate the damage to the judiciary from
occurring in the first place. It may seem odd at first glance that in this Article about recusal,
the key jurisprudential change that I recommend is not actually a change to recusal rules at all,
but rather a new approach to regulating judges and aspiring judges. Nonetheless, I hope to
show that to maximize the appearance of impartiality, the time to think about recusal is before
the appearance of bias arises in the first place.
15. Damon M. Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing
Citizens’ Diffuse Support for State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297, 313 (2007).
16. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
237, 245 (1987).
17. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
18. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
19. Of course, another solution would be to eliminate judicial elections altogether.
However, the public strongly supports judicial elections, and eliminating judicial elections at
this time is politically infeasible.
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assumption that the substantive recusal rule is the key factor in
creating the appearance of judicial impartiality.
Part III starts with the proposition that the public’s perception of
judicial conduct—the appearance of fairness and partiality—must be
considered in recusal and disqualification rules and standards. It
nevertheless concludes that relying solely on the “appearance of bias”
standard—an ex post standard that has largely been accepted by
judges and scholars—fails to create an appearance of impartiality. I
challenge the long-accepted and virtually uncontroverted assumption
that a judge’s recusal can eliminate the appearance of impartiality. To
the contrary, I argue that the mere act of recusal is an ineffective way
to restore the public’s confidence in the courts, in part because it
comes much too late. Although the empirical data on this issue is
very limited, some preliminary research suggests that once the public
has perceived conditions that create impartiality or bias, the recusal
decision alone cannot fully restore public confidence. Furthermore, I
argue that making appearance-based recusal decisions in individual
cases on an ad hoc basis may not create an appearance of impartiality,
no matter the substantive standard. Both of these conclusions
require substantially more empirical analysis, but this Article suggests
that it is a field worth a closer look.
Part IV proposes a solution: to maximize the appearance of
impartiality and protect the reputation of the judiciary, we must
implement ex ante regulations of judicial conduct that prevent the
need for recusal altogether whenever possible. When recusal cannot
be avoided, I propose the implementation of systemic, appearancebased procedural recusal rules. The appearance-based recusal
procedures are themselves the ends of my proposal, not the means by
which we accomplish some other goal (namely, the “right”
substantive result). And while I leave open the question of what
specific ex ante rules and which particular recusal procedures do the
most to maximize and restore the appearance of judicial impartiality,
I conclude with some suggestions about how my proposals could be
implemented.
II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PAST AND PRESENT
The American legal system is based on a simple and
noncontroversial proposition: a fair and neutral judge is essential to
the operation of a just legal system. This maxim was recognized
950
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throughout the history of legal institutions, and, in some respects,
the academic scholarship on the judiciary, and the judicial role is
about advancing fair, impartial, and independent judges.
Disqualification of unfair and non-neutral judges is just one method
commonly used to ensure impartiality within the judiciary.20 After all,
judges are human and often develop personal and professional
relationships that may hinder their ability to preside over a dispute in
a fair and impartial manner. This Part provides an overview of the
history and development of recusal rules in the United States. The
recusal scheme that exists in the United States today has its roots in
English common law. Exploring the history of recusal rules and
standards helps explain recent controversies surrounding judicial
disqualification in state and federal courts. The discussion will also
highlight the important role that appearances—public perception of
the judiciary and confidence in the courts—play in current recusal
jurisprudence.
A. Roots
Early Jewish and Roman law recognized the importance of
judicial impartiality.21 In fact, medieval Jewish law prohibited judges
from participating in cases involving a friend or a kinsman,22 and the
Roman Code of Justinian provided for removal of judges for mere

20. There are, of course, more draconian measures that can be used to remove biased or
partial judges, including censure, reprimand, and impeachment. Often, these measures are
reserved for judges who engage in blatant corruption or violate other ethical rules. See, e.g., Ian
Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2009, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/
13judge.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1300986369-2HIFqUYyJrX5IElf75zRAQ.
21. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5. Bracton set out the common law rule for
disqualification in the thirteenth century:
A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a
suspicion, which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the
plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his
kinsman or a member of his household, or a table-companion, or he has been his
counsellor or his pleader in that cause or in another, and in any such like capacity.
6 HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIE 249 (Travers Twiss
trans., 1883).
22. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5 (citing THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: BOOK
FOURTEEN, THE BOOK OF JUDGES 68–70 (Julian Obermann et al. eds., Abraham M.
Hershman trans., Yale Univ. Press 1949)). The Talmud, dating back to the third century,
“created strict prohibitions on judges’ interactions with parties.” Jay Hall, Note, The Road Less
Traveled: The Third Circuit’s Preservation of Judicial Impartiality in an Imperfect World, 50
VILL. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2005).
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suspicion of bias.23 Similarly, English common law provided for
replacement of a suspect judge and recognized the maxim that “no
man ought to be a judge in his own cause.”24 But by the 18th
century, the common-law recusal practice was exceedingly simple
and highly constrained: only if he had a direct pecuniary interest in
the case was the judge to be disqualified.25
Commentators, including Blackstone, and English courts of that
time rejected the notion that a judge should be disqualified from
hearing a case merely because he may be biased.26 This was largely
due to the then-prevalent respect for judges.27 “[T]he law will not
suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge,” Blackstone wrote,
“who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”28
Recusal was not required even when family members appeared as
parties in front of a judge.29
B. Judicial Disqualification in the United States
Under the common law, and in the British Commonwealth even
to this day, the law on judicial recusal is largely judge-made. In the
United States, federal and state legislation also play a key role in
regulating judicial disqualification. This is an important distinction,
as this Article will later argue that judges are not in the best position
to regulate their own conduct, whether it comes to recusal
procedures or to the substantive recusal standard. For now, however,
let us examine the history and development of the standard.
23. Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923).
24. Dr. Bonham’s Case, [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (P.C.); accord Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 525 (1927).
25. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609–12 (1947). The
two leading common law authorities for this proposition are the Sir Nicholas Bacon’s Case,
[1563] 73 Eng. Rep. 487, and the Earl of Derby’s Case, [1614] 77 Eng. Rep. 1390.
26. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361; Brookes v. Rivers, [1668] 145
Eng. Rep. 569 (holding that a judge was not required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law’s
case).
27. Of course, one could argue it was also partly due to a lack of understanding of
human nature and subconscious bias. See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER,
PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 267–301 (2010) (discussing biases in processing and judging
information, including hindsight bias, confirmation bias, and overconfidence).
28. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361.
29. Brookes, 145 Eng. Rep. at 569 (explaining that a judge need not recuse himself from
a brother-in-law’s case because “favour shall not be presumed in a judge”).
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1. Federal recusal statutes
Although the American Founders shared some of the English
reverence for the judiciary, and American disqualification law grew
directly out of the common law tradition, American judges—at least
American federal judges—have historically been held to a more
stringent recusal standard than judges in England.30 Judges continue
to take an oath swearing to administer justice “faithfully and
impartially.”31 But in virtually every jurisdiction, financial interest is
now only one of many disqualifying factors, which also include
familial and professional connections to the parties or their counsel,
prejudice, partiality, bias, and knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts.32
Leading up to the American Revolution, colonists adopted the
simple and narrow common law recusal rule described above. But
shortly thereafter, in 1792, Congress passed the United States’ first
recusal statute.33 It is unknown why Congress stepped into the fray
so quickly, but the passage of the law was perhaps a sign of a concern
that the recusal issue should not be left entirely to judges. This initial
legislation was narrowly drawn and interpreted, and did not prohibit
judges from hearing cases in which they might have a bias for or
against a party.34 Rather, the statute largely codified the common law
disqualification rules and called for disqualification of a district court
judge who was “concerned in interest,” as well as judges who had
“been of counsel for either party.”35
30. As I explain in greater detail below, while the substantive recusal standard has
changed significantly since the common law, and we have a much greater understanding of
both conscious and subconscious bias, the recusal procedures used in common law are still
prevalent today.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006). Each judge and justice of the United States must take the
following oath:
“I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as
________________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help
me God.”
32. See FLAMM, supra note 2, chs. 23–27 (surveying disqualification rules in state and
federal courts).
33. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278–79 (amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1821,
ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643).
34. Id. In other words, Congress did not entirely reject the simple recusal standard that
was in place in England.
35. Id.
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Over the next two centuries, the federal recusal statute was
amended and shaped. The federal statute that governs recusals by
federal judges today is 28 U.S.C. § 455.36 It is divided into two
parts. Section 455(a) is a general catch-all provision that requires
disqualification whenever a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”37 This standard was intended to promote not only the
impartiality of the judiciary but also the public perception of the
impartiality of the judicial process.38 No longer do we tolerate all
non-financial bias by our judges. Instead, the statute is interpreted to
proscribe even the appearance of bias, as viewed from the perspective
of an objective observer.
This appearance-based standard has been in place since the
statute was amended in 1974 and was intended to overrule the dutyto-sit doctrine, which suggested that close questions on
disqualification issues should be resolved in favor of hearing the
case.39 Section 455(a) has been described by the Court as a
“catchall” provision, covering all kinds of bias and prejudice, and
requiring an objective evaluation rather than the earlier subjective
standard.40
Section 455(b), on the other hand, lists specific circumstances
requiring disqualification.41 Some consider the § 455(b) list as an a
36. This statute is a descendant of the original 1792 statute, which was altered in 1821
by the Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; in 1891 by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 23,
§ 21, 36 Stat. 1090; then again in 1911 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat.
1087, 1090; and recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1948.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974); see also S. REP. NO. 93-419, at 5 (1973);
Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988) (“The general
language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process by replacing the subjective ‘in his opinion’ standard with an objective test.”).
39. Mark T. Coberly, Note, Caesar’s Wife Revisited—Judicial Disqualification After the
1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1977).
40. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 870–71
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Subsection 455(b)(1) requires a judge to recuse himself when
he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) requires
recusal “[w]here in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning
the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning [the matter in
controversy].” Id. § 455(b)(2). Subsection (b)(3) requires recusal when the judge “has served
in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
particular case in controversy.” Id. § 455(b)(3). Subsection (b)(4) demands recusal when the
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priori, per se determination of conditions that automatically satisfy
the standard set forth in § 455(a), while others regard the list as a
predetermined set of circumstances that involve actual bias rather
than “the public perception of the judicial process.”42 Section 455(b)
is implicated in cases involving allegations of personal bias or
prejudice, or when the judge’s relationships and interests—including
prior employment, family relationships, and financial interests—
create a conflict of interest. In other words, unlike § 455(a), which
focuses on how a reasonable person would perceive the judicial
conduct, § 455(b) addresses circumstances that are likely (in the eyes
of the legislature) to create actual bias towards a party to the
litigation.
Despite numerous amendments, each broadening and expanding
the disqualification standards, judges have always interpreted the
statute narrowly.43 This is partly because judges apply the law to
themselves, and most judges hesitate to admit that they are so biased
or so interested in a case as to be unable to render a fair, impartial
decision. Research in cognitive psychology has recognized various
biases that may affect judicial decision making on recusal, including
unconscious bias and self-serving bias.44 In addition, the judge-

judge
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in
his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding.
Id. § 455(b)(4). Finally, subsection (b)(5) requires recusal when a spouse, or close relative, is a
party in the proceeding or the lawyer to a party in the proceeding, has outside information
regarding the case in controversy, or stands to gain financially from the case’s outcome. Id. §
455(b)(5).
42. Compare Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in
Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049–50 (1993) (arguing that § 455(b) particularizes
the grounds for disqualification that satisfy the catch-all standard of § 455(a)), with Herrington
v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Section 455(b) covers
situations in which an actual conflict of interest exists, even if there is no appearance of one.”)
(emphasis omitted); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir.
1988).
43. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540–41 (2005).
44. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999)
(discussing unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–80 (2000)
(discussing self-serving bias).
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created “duty to sit” doctrine encouraged judges to err on the side
of remaining on a case even when there was a strong argument in
favor of recusal.45
Judicial reluctance to acknowledge bias is only part of the reason
why federal recusal statutes have had only limited success. Bias is a
difficult concept to define. Generally, bias is defined as an
“[i]nclination; prejudice, predilection; a preconceived opinion; a
predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which
does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction.”46
Unfortunately, the attempts to draw bright lines for judges to follow
have focused predominantly on judges’ financial interests at the
expense of all other interests.47 In fact, the disclosures required of all
federal judges address only financial holdings.48 The focus on
financial interests is understandable since financial interests are
generally easier to define and identify. Furthermore, the popularity
of law and economics—which claims that wealth maximization
motivates human behavior—shifts the emphasis even more to a
judge’s financial ties.
A second recusal statute, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144, allows
litigants to seek disqualification of a district court judge for any
alleged bias or prejudice and establishes a broader recusal standard.
Under this statute, judges have limited discretion about whether to
recuse; litigants need only file an affidavit alleging sufficient facts to
infer a judge’s prejudice.49 Once such an affidavit is filed, the facts
contained in the affidavit are presumptively valid, and a judge is
automatically disqualified from the case.50 In Berger v. United States,
the Supreme Court explained that this statute prohibits a judge from

45. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009).
47. A judge must recuse himself when “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000). Financial interest is defined as
“ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small” Id. § 455(d)(4).
48. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101–102, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2000); see also Richard
Carelli, Judges’ Financial Reports Hit Web, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2000.
49. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
50. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 25.2.1, at 721 (“On its face § 144 appears to be a
peremptory disqualification provision, and there is little doubt that it was originally intended to
be one.”).
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ruling on the truth of the allegations in a party’s affidavit, requiring
disqualification so long as the affidavit is facially sufficient.51
However, judges have adopted a narrow definition of prejudice
and continue to review the affidavit to determine whether the
litigants have satisfied the statutory requirements.52 In other words,
the very judge whose fairness is under review rules on the sufficiency
of the affidavit. Professor Frank has explained:
Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow
construction of the phrase “bias and prejudice.” Affidavits are
found not “legally sufficient” on the ground that the specific acts
mentioned do not in fact indicate “bias and prejudice,” a reasoning
which emasculates the Berger decision by transferring the point of
conflict.53

2. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
While 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144 control only in federal courts,54
nearly every state has adopted the American Bar Association’s Code of
Judicial Conduct.55 The Code, therefore, governs judicial

51. 255 U.S. at 36.
52. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1213, 1224 (2002).
53. Frank, supra note 25, at 629. Countervailing a judge’s duty to recuse was a
judicially created “duty to sit,” first articulated by the Fifth Circuit. Edwards v. United States,
334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964). That court explained that “[i]t is a judge’s duty to
refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason
for recusation.” Id. The “duty to sit” provided the ammunition for judges to err on the side of
nonrecusal, even when recusal was arguably justified. Although the duty to sit doctrine was
eventually accepted by all circuits, see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972), the duty to
sit has now largely been rejected.
54. The Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court looks to the Code for guidance. See Caprice L.
Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last
Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 111 (2004). In light of recent controversies surrounding
recusal of Supreme Court Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, some commentators
and law professors have called on the Court to adopt the Code for itself or for Congress to
impose such adoption upon the Court.
55. The original Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924 by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association and ultimately by a majority of the states over the
course of the next five decades. The House of Delegates adopted more explicit standards for
judicial conduct in 1972 and ultimately adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in
1990. That Code was superseded by a revised Code adopted in February 2007 by the ABA
House of Delegates. The 2007 revision is available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
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disqualification in almost all American state courts56 and applies to all
full-time judges and all legal and quasi-legal proceedings.57
Rule 2.11 of the 2007 Code states: “A judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned . . . .”58 Impartiality is defined as the
“absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties
or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in
considering issues that may come before the judge.”59 In many ways,
disqualification under the Code resembles disqualification under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a): both have been interpreted to impose an
appearance-based disqualification standard.60 Both also leave judges
with broad discretion in interpreting and applying this standard, and
judges have exploited this discretion to downplay the potential for an
appearance of bias.61 I discuss disqualification of state and federal
judges interchangeably, as any distinctions between the two are
generally inapposite for the purposes of this Article.
C. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause
In addition to the federal statutes and the state judicial codes, the
Constitution’s Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a right to
have their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges.62 The
Supreme Court has held that a biased judge violates the litigant’s
constitutional rights, requiring either a new trial or a new hearing on

56. Forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or another. Leslie W.
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might
Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000).
57. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is another ethical code that applies
to most federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. The Code, adopted and
revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States, does not govern the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court because the Conference has no authority to create rules
controlling the Supreme Court. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v.
Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2006).
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2.11 (2007). The rule goes on to list
specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, although the
list is not exhaustive.
59. Id.
60. Abramson, supra note 56, at 55 n.2 (“Whether a judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned is also referred to as the appearance of partiality, appearance of
impropriety, or negative appearances.”).
61. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 680
(2005).
62. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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appeal without the tainted judge’s presence.63 These holdings,
however, are exceptions rather than the rule, and it has long been
thought that the Constitution mandates disqualification in only very
limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has explained that
“matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion”
rather than a constitutional recusal floor.64 For decades, it was
thought that recusal was mandated under the Due Process Clause in
only two circumstances: (1) when the judge has a financial interest in
one of the parties; or (2) when the judge presides over a criminal
contempt hearing after presiding over an earlier hearing in which the
contemptuous behavior took place. But in Caperton, the Supreme
Court held that recusal is also mandated when the judge’s
relationship with one of the litigants creates a probability of bias.65
Although Caperton involved a judge who decided a case involving a
supporter of the judge’s election bid, the holding of the case does
not appear to be limited to the electoral context.66 Nonetheless, it
remains to be seen whether Caperton will change recusal analysis
under the Due Process Clause, or if it will be a one-off case limited
to its facts. These three categories of recusal—the two classic
standards, and the new Caperton standard—are discussed in greater
detail below.
1. Financial interest
The first situation where the Due Process Clause requires
disqualification is when the judge may benefit financially depending
on the outcome of the case. In the leading case, Tumey v. State of
Ohio, an Ohio statute authorized a mayor to preside over cases as a
judge.67 The mayor then received court costs assessed against a
convicted defendant, but not an acquitted one. The Court held that
this incentive scheme threatened judicial impartiality and invalidated
the statute on due process grounds, explaining that due process is

63. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.”).
64. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va.
266, 270 (1884)).
65. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
66. See id. at 2257, 2267.
67. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 510.
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violated when a judge is “paid for his service only when he convicts
the defendant.”68 In its holding, the Court relied on the common
law rule that a judge may not have a “direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest” in the case.69 That rule has its origins in the
maxim that no person is allowed to be “a judge in his own cause,
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and . . .
corrupt his integrity.”70 This result is neither controversial nor
surprising; a judge should not receive “contingency fees” for
convicting a defendant.71
A judge’s interest need not be a direct financial one to violate
due process. For example, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville the
Court held that a mayor could not preside as a judge over ordinance
violations and traffic offenses when contributions to the town’s
budget came from the fines assessed by the court.72 While the
mayor’s salary did not depend on his conviction rate, the mayor still
had a financial incentive to convict; he was responsible for the town’s
revenue production. That incentive, held the Court, is inconsistent
with due process.73
Similar incentives were held to violate due process in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.74 There, an Alabama Supreme Court justice
ruled in favor of the plaintiff on his bad faith claim against Aetna. It
turned out, however, that the same judge had filed two nearly
identical actions against other insurance companies making similar
allegations and seeking punitive damages.75 Those cases were still
pending in Alabama’s lower courts at the time the Aetna case was
decided. The Supreme Court held that the justice’s refusal to recuse
violated the Due Process Clause. Without deciding whether the
justice was in fact influenced by his pending cases, the Court
explained that the circumstances “would offer a possible temptation

68. Id. at 531.
69. Id. at 523.
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
71. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 249 (2010).
72. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Between 1964 and 1968, the fines, forfeitures, costs, and
fees that the court had imposed provided nearly one-half of the village’s annual revenue. Id. at
58.
73. Id. at 60 (“The mayor’s executive responsibilities [sic] for village finances may make
him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.”).
74. 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986).
75. Id. at 817.
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to the average judge to lead him to not to [sic] hold the balance
nice, clear and true.”76 In other words, recusal was necessary not
because of the justice’s ill will towards insurance companies, but
rather because his decision “had the clear and immediate effect of
enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own
case.”77 As with Tumey and Ward, the judge could have used his
position on the bench to further his own financial interests, acting as
“a judge in his own case.”78
In short, before Caperton, the “interested judge” category was
fairly straightforward: if the judge could be linked to any financial
interest, disqualification was required. The common thread in all of
these cases was that the presiding judge derived a direct or indirect
benefit by ruling in favor of one of the litigants.
2. Criminal contempt
The second disqualification category that falls within the confines
of the Due Process Clause does not involve any financial interest to
the judge. Instead, the Court has held that the due process forbids a
judge from wearing too many hats. For example, in In re Murchison,
the Court found a violation of the Due Process Clause although the
judge did not have a personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the case.79 There, the Court set aside contempt convictions and held
that it is a violation of due process for the same judge to serve as the
one-person grand jury and then preside over a contempt proceeding
related to the grand jury hearing.80
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, which followed In re Murchison, is also
instructive.81 In Mayberry, the defendant, in the course of trial,
verbally attacked the presiding judge82 and continuously interrupted
court, to the point where Mayberry had to be removed from the

76. Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
77. Id. at 824.
78. Id.; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding that an
administrative board made up of optometrists was disqualified from presiding over a hearing
against competing optometrists).
79. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
80. Id.
81. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971).
82. Defendant referred to the judge as a “hatchet man for the State,” a “dirty
sonofabitch,” and a “dirty, tyrannical old dog.” Id. at 456–57.
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courtroom.83 The Supreme Court held that when the defendant
faces criminal contempt charges he “should be given a public trial
before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.”84
Again, disqualification was necessary because of the interaction
between the judge and the defendant prior to the contempt
hearing.85 The Court explained that a “vilified” judge “necessarily
becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so
cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary
for fair adjudication.”86
3. Caperton v. Massey
This was the state of recusal law under the Due Process Clause
until Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.87 In that case, West Virginia
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of
the appellant, Massey, whose CEO, Don Blankenship, was an
extremely generous supporter of Justice Benjamin in the previous
West Virginia Supreme Court election campaign. Blankenship
contributed more to Benjamin’s campaign than all other donors
combined, all while his attorneys were preparing the Caperton case
for an appeal.88 Justice Benjamin refused Caperton’s recusal request
and voted with the majority in a three–two decision overturning the
trial court’s verdict.89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
83. Id. at 462.
84. Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a
lawyer for contempt committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity to be
heard in defense or mitigation. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974). In such
circumstances, a different judge should conduct the contempt trial in place of the judge who
initiated the contempt.
85. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465.
86. Id.
87. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
88. During the campaign Blankenship spent approximately $3 million to help Justice
Benjamin. However, only $1000, the West Virginia limit for direct campaign contributions,
was given directly to Benjamin’s campaign. The rest of the money (i) funded a tax-exempt
organization, And for the Sake of the Kids, which was formed to defeat incumbent Justice
McGraw, and (ii) was spent on newspaper and television advertising attacking McGraw. See
Brief for Petitioners at 6–8, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No.
08-22).
89. Id. at 2. The case’s long history and factual background is not relevant for the
purposes of this Article. It should be noted, however, that recusal played a prominent role in
the case’s procedural history. After Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the original appeal,
Blankenship’s relationship with yet another justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court drew
substantial public attention when photographs surfaced showing Blankenship and Justice
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Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse violated Caperton’s right to due
process.
After Caperton, there is little doubt that recusal is required under
the Due Process Clause even when the judge has no personal interest
in the outcome of the litigation and did not act as both a judge and a
prosecutor or witness in the same case. It remains to be seen,
however, whether this case is a trendsetter and will change the way
that states approach judicial recusal, or if it is simply an outlier that
will have limited jurisprudential effect. Some have suggested that the
Caperton holding is fairly narrow, requiring a judge to recuse
“himself because of campaign contributions or independent
expenditures by an individual who is not a lawyer or party before the
Court but has an interest in a case that is before the court.”90 And
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion takes great pains to convey the
limited precedential effect of the Court’s decision. The opinion
describes the situation as “exceptional” and “extreme;”91 so
exceptional, in fact, that “[a]pplication of the constitutional standard
implicated in this case will thus be confined to rare instances.”92
But there is no reason to believe that the decision is limited
solely to the campaign contribution context. Rather, the Caperton
test may be satisfied, and disqualification may be required, even
outside the universe of judicial elections and campaign contributions.
For example, the Court accepted the notion that Justice Benjamin
“would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his
extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”93 There is nothing in that
notion—the idea of a debt of gratitude—that is limited to judicial
elections. Would a federal judge feel a debt of gratitude to the
president who selected her? Or perhaps to the judge’s former
colleague at a large law firm who helped the judge in some life
endeavor? How the lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s

Elliott Maynard vacationing together on the French Riviera. John Gibeaut, Caperton’s Coal:
The Battle over an Appalachian Mine Exposes a Nasty Vein in Bench Politics, 95 A.B.A. J. 52, 56
(2009). As a result of the controversy, Justice Maynard recused himself from the case. Id. At
around the same time, Justice Larry Starcher, a critic of Massey and Blankenship, also recused
himself from the case. Id.
90. Rotunda, supra note 711, at 256.
91. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 2265, 2267.
92. Id. at 2267.
93. Id. at 2262.
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decision in Caperton will be one of the most important trends to
follow in the area of judicial ethics.
D. Recent Incidents
Recusal has garnered national headlines on many occasions over
the last few decades. Judges have been denied appointments to the
Supreme Court,94 suspended,95 and have faced other sanctions and
general opprobrium for their recusal-related misconduct.96 But in the
last decade alone, five current Supreme Court Justices—Justice
Scalia, along with Justices Thomas,97 Ginsburg,98 Roberts,99 and

94. When President Nixon nominated Judge Clement Haynsworth to the United States
Supreme Court, his failure to recuse ultimately led to his nomination being defeated. First,
Haynsworth’s opponents pointed out that he sat on an important labor case involving the
Deering Milliken Darlington Manufacturing Company while owning stock in a vending
company that installed and serviced vending machines in the Deering plants. See Peter W.
Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 929–30
(2007). The Senate Judiciary Committee closely scrutinized Judge Haynsworth’s interest in
the vending company and its relations with Deering. Id. at 930. Later, it was learned that
Haynsworth purchased stock in the Brunswick Corporation while a case involving Brunswick
was under submission, after oral argument and before the draft decision was circulated. Frank,
supra note 2, at 56. Haynsworth did not recuse himself. In large part due to his improper
conduct on the bench and failure to recuse himself in the Deering and Brunswick cases,
Haynsworth’s nomination was denied by the Senate. See Bowie, supra, at 930.
95. For example, the Tenth Circuit suspended District Judge Stephen Chandler from all
judicial duties after he refused to recuse himself in two cases. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398
U.S. 74 (1970).
96. See generally JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 236–252
(1974); Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code:
The Parting of Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2007).
97. Justice Thomas’s wife, Virginia Thomas, is alleged to have ties to the Tea Party and
has been active in conservative politics. Recently, House Democrats called for Justice Thomas
to recuse himself from hearing any challenge to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act. See Huma Khan, Should Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan Sit Out
Health Care Case?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/supreme-court-justice-clarence-thomas-sit-health-care/stor y?id=12878346.
98. The controversy stemmed from her involvement with the National Organization of
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund. In light of her involvement, thirteen Republican
Congressmen demanded that Justice Ginsburg recuse herself from all future abortion cases.
GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004,
at A15.
99. Justice Roberts was questioned about his continued involvement in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld after he was approached about a potential nomination to the United States Supreme
Court. The case was considered to be important to the President, and some scholars have
commented that Roberts should have recused himself from Hamdan after he learned that he
was being considered for the nomination to the Supreme Court. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Propriety of a Judge’s Failure to Recuse When Being Considered for Another Position, 19 GEO. J.
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Alito100—have been embroiled in recusal-related controversies.
Justice Scalia’s denial of plaintiffs’ recusal request in Cheney v. United
States District Court is perhaps the most controversial incident in the
last decade.101 In the underlying action, plaintiffs sought discovery
regarding an Energy Advisory Panel that was convened by then-Vice
President Dick Cheney. When the issue reached the Supreme Court,
one of the plaintiffs asked Justice Scalia to recuse himself because
while the appeal was pending, Scalia and Cheney took a duckhunting trip together. Justice Scalia denied the recusal motion,
concluding that his impartiality could not reasonably be
questioned.102
Even before the Supreme Court’s Caperton decision, Judge
McKeown called judicial recusal the “topic du jour.”103 But despite
all this controversy, “the theoretical underpinnings of American
judicial
disqualification
jurisprudence
remain
murky, . . .
unsettled, . . . and replete with inconsistencies.”104 Recusal experts
have commented that “judicial disqualification frequently is
subjective, random, and arbitrary,”105 and that “disqualification law is
a sprawling patchwork, as thin as it is wide.”106 Although judicial bias
and recusal have always been issues of considerable importance,
recusal has recently taken on an even greater significance that
demands immediate scholarly attention. As judicial elections become
“noisier, nastier and costlier,” recusal becomes more and more
important to minimize the judicial bias created in the course of
judicial elections.107

LEGAL ETHICS 1187 (2006).
100. While he was a judge on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito sat on a case in which
Vanguard, a mutual fund management firm in which he had invested, was a party. Judge Alito
wrote the opinion affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. R. Jeffrey Smith, Judge
Participated in 2002 Vanguard Case Despite Promise to Recuse, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR20051031016
86.html
101. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
102. Id. at 929.
103. McKeown, supra note 8, at 45.
104. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 14.
105. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 4–5 (1995).
106. Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal
Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 517–18 (2007).
107. Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 76 (1985).
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This transformation of judicial elections is no minor point. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White108 and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission109 are
part of the recent trend that has seen judicial elections come to
resemble legislative elections. Over 70 percent of Americans believe
that judges receiving campaign contributions are not impartial in
litigation involving those contributors,110 and numerous empirical
studies demonstrate that judges tend to rule in favor of their
campaign contributors.111 Even judges do not believe that their
colleagues can be impartial when dealing with those who helped
them get elected.112 In this legal environment, recusal is necessary to
ensure that bias stemming from judicial campaign contributions and
judicial elections is minimized. In fact, judicial recusal may be the
only way to deal with the appearances of partiality created when
judges accept contributions from lawyers and persons who ultimately
appear as litigants in front of the judge.
III. IS GETTING IT RIGHT ENOUGH?
As the discussion above shows, most jurisdictions in the United
States have implemented recusal standards that revolve primarily
around the appearance of impartiality. That is, in determining
whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case, the
challenged judge’s actual state of mind is largely irrelevant; the

108. 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (striking down a Minnesota judicial canon that
prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on legal issues).
109. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that federal restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures and electioneering communications are unconstitutional).
110. See GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE
FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001), available at http://www.gqrr.com/articles/1617/
1412_JAS_ntlsurvey.pdf; ZOGBY INT’L FOR THE JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, MARCH 2004
SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS: AMERICANS SPEAK ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2004), available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/transparency/articles_publications/publ
ications/justiceatstake_20040506/c_zogby_summary.pdf; see also David E. Pozen, The Irony
of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 305 (2008).
111. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623
(2009) (finding a “strong relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ rulings”
and demonstrating that elected judges “routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and
campaign money”); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002); Margaret S. Williams &
Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys’ Contributions on State
Supreme Courts, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007).
112. Pozen, supra note 110, at 305.
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recusal decision hinges on the perceptions of “a reasonable person
knowing all the relevant facts.”113 This standard is intended “to
protect the . . . appearance of impartiality.”114 Of course, recusal is
also required in the event the judge is actually biased, but rarely does
a disqualification inquiry turn on a judge’s actual bias.115 Cases of
actual bias are rare, in part because an “affirmative finding of actual
bias requires direct evidence or a very strong inference that the judge
was so predisposed against a party that he or she had an entirely
closed mind.”116 Indeed, the appearance-of-bias test came into
existence to address the problems inherent in a disqualification rule
that either requires the litigant to show that the judge is “actually
biased” or demands that the judge so conclude on her own. While
some scholars and judges have criticized the appearance-based
substantive recusal standard, few people dispute that appearances are
important to the American judiciary and are a valid, if not a
compelling, consideration in setting rules to govern judicial
disqualification.117 Alexander Hamilton observed that the judicial

113. Roberts v. Bilar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980).
114. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988).
115. In Caperton, the Supreme Court held that a judge must recuse himself when there is
a probability of actual bias. I have previously argued that the probability-based rule announced
in Caperton is different and distinct from the appearance-based rule contained in the federal
recusal statute and the state judicial codes. See generally Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton:
Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65 (2010).
Others, including Justice Ginsburg, disagree. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35,
Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf (“I was taking
appearance, likelihood, probability as all synonyms . . . .”); cf. Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New
Right to Independence in Judges, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 707 (2010) (“The Court’s due
process standard, however, is really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and
judicial codes.”); Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars,
Mandatory Recusal and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 370 (2009) (discussing the
terms “appearance,” “perception,” and “probability” and treating them as synonymous);
116. GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS 17
(2008).
117. For criticism, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety,
and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (2006)
(arguing that appearance-based standards for judicial conduct are too vague to protect the
judiciary); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What
the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914 (2010). Despite the fact that
both authors criticize the “appearance of impropriety” standard, neither appears to question
that appearances themselves are important for a successful and well-functioning judiciary. My
proposal in this Article gets around many of the problems identified by Rotunda and McKoski
by taking the appearance inquiry out of the hands of individual judges and allowing
appearances to be considered ex ante, only in implementing rules of judicial conduct and
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branch has “no influence, over either the sword or the purse.”118
Policymakers today appreciate that judges lack both electoral
legitimacy and political force, making the judiciary’s success depend
in large part on the public’s acceptance of its authority.119 Without
such acceptance, a judicial proclamation carries no weight, and court
rulings are routinely ignored.120 If the public lacks confidence in the
impartiality of judges, or worse, refuses to comply with judicial
decisions voluntarily, the notion that “we are a government of laws”
would necessarily collapse. If for no other reason, courts should be
protective of their reputation from public outrage and rejection for
the sake of self-preservation.121
Just as policymakers recognize the importance of appearances
and public perception in setting recusal standards, judges
acknowledge that the success of the judiciary hinges in large part on
public confidence—the people’s faith—in the impartiality,
independence, and accountability of the judiciary. Justice John Paul
Stevens once said, “[i]t is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of
law.”122 The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of
appearances, stating that “our system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness” and that “to perform
its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice.’”123 Appearance of fairness, in other words, is as important
as fairness itself.124 Thus, in considering the effectiveness of a recusal
scheme, impartiality is only part of the equation; appearance of
impartiality and appearance of justice are perhaps just as important.125
recusal procedures.
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
119. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
120. MACKENZIE, supra note 96, at ix. There are many nations where judges’ rulings are
routinely ignored and many others where the judiciary is held in disrepute because of its lack of
independence, rampant corruption, or other forces.
121. Id.
122. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence
in its moral sanction.”).
123. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
124. Ex parte Bryant, 682 So. 2d 39, 41 (Ala. 1996).
125. Cf. Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or
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But even if one starts with the assumption that appearances
should continue to play a key role in recusal jurisprudence, we must
still ask how and when appearances should be considered, what role
public perception should play, and whether certain rules indeed
foster the public’s confidence in the judiciary or, to the contrary,
impede it. This is where current recusal jurisprudence goes astray.
Despite my enthusiastic support for the consideration of appearances
in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, I argue that scholars writing
about recusal, as well as politicians and bar associations setting
recusal rules and judges enforcing those rules, have paid undue
attention to the substantive recusal standard at the expense of other
rules and standards that may actually be more important when it
comes to maximizing the appearance of impartiality.
A. “Getting to Recusal”
Today, the entire “appearance” inquiry takes place at one
discrete point of a recusal timeline: the time when the actual recusal
decision is made. It is only then that the appearance-of-bias test is
triggered, and only then that anybody—usually the very judge whose
continued presence on the case is being questioned—considers the
potential effect on public perception if the challenged judge
continues to preside over, or casts a vote in, the case. The timing is
generally not viewed as a problem because of the widely accepted
assumption that if the judge makes the correct recusal decision,
public confidence in the judiciary will be restored. In other words, so
long as the judge reaches a “correct” recusal decision, law essentially
operates on the well-established playground basketball principle of
“no harm, no foul.” Under this assumption, postponing
consideration of appearances until this late juncture makes perfect
sense.
Operating under this assumption, policymakers (when it comes
to recusal, the policymakers are usually legislators, bar associations,
or state supreme courts) have focused almost entirely on the
substantive recusal standard, amending it when controversies arise
and defining more precisely the circumstances that should lead to
recusal.126 For example, at the federal level, when Congress decides

Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 267 (1978) (identifying the importance of “a judicial
system that not only is impartial in fact, but also appears to render disinterested justice”).
126. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (providing that federal judges are disqualified in

969

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 1:15 PM

2011

to amend the judicial disqualification statute, it almost always
“enlarge[s] the enumerated grounds for seeking disqualification.”127
The focus on the substantive standard has led to what some
commentators have termed a “vicious cycle.”128 Describing the
holding pattern in the development of judicial disqualification
doctrine in the United States, Amanda Frost wrote:
First, Congress sets the standard governing when judges must
remove themselves from sitting on cases in which they are not able,
or might not be able, to be impartial. That standard is then
narrowly construed by the judges who must apply it to decide
whether they themselves should be disqualified from a case.
Eventually, a particularly egregious situation arises in which a judge
sits on a case when most outside observers think that she should
have stepped aside. The situation comes to the attention of the
press, the public, and ultimately Congress, which amends the law
to provide stiffer standards for recusal. And then the whole process
begins anew.129

But it is not only politicians and bar leaders who operate under
this assumption. Most of the scholarship in the field has focused on
what I call “getting to recusal”—that is, seeking solutions that will
lead to the “correct” substantive recusal decision, assuming, once
again, that if judges can reach such a decision, recusal will do its job.
In discussing recusal, scholars generally pay insufficient attention to
preventing the underlying event or conduct from occurring.
Much of the normative recusal scholarship falls into one of two
broad categories.130 The first focuses on the substantive recusal
standard itself. Some authors argue that the appearance-based recusal
standard is misguided and should be changed.131 For example, Sarah
Cravens suggests that the main goal of judicial ethics is to achieve
not the appearance of justice but rather actual justice in judicial
decision making.132 She argues that impartiality concerns should be

certain narrowly drawn scenarios).
127. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 23.1, at 670.
128. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 245.
129. Frost, supra note 43, at 538.
130. There is of course a great deal of descriptive scholarship looking at the history and
evolution of judicial recusals, describing trends in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, and
discussing the implications of particular recusal decisions.
131. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007).
132. Id.
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addressed not through recusal standards that focus on appearance,
but rather “through a requirement that judges provide explanations
of adequate internal legal reasons supporting their dispositive
decisions.”133 Others defend the standard against these attacks,
arguing that appearances should continue to play an important or
even greater role in the substantive recusal standard.134 Both camps,
however, focus on the actual recusal decision; their disagreement is
only about the standard that should be applied. They both mirror
the approach that Congress has taken, tinkering with the substantive
recusal standards and amending judicial disqualification statutes.
The second, larger category of recusal-related scholarship
involves attempts by academics to identify the facts and
circumstances that should lead to disqualification under the current,
appearance-based standard.135 Here, again, the focus is on the recusal
decision, but this time the effort is not to formulate the best
substantive standard but rather to determine when recusal is
necessary in the current scheme. For example, in a recent article,
Keith Swisher argues that judges taking a “tough on crime” stance in
the course of judicial elections should be disqualified under the
current appearance-based recusal standard because their impartiality
may reasonably be questioned.136 Others have argued for additional
guidance and inclusion of specific, clear, bright-line substantive rules
that would aid the court in deciding whether refusal to recuse would
create an appearance of impropriety.137
The assumption that a stringent recusal standard can negate the
damage to appearances, and reinforce the appearance of judicial
impartiality, also motivates judges. Concurring in White, which
struck down a provision in Minnesota’s code of judicial ethics that
prohibited judicial election candidates from discussing political issues
and announcing their positions on those issues, Justice Kennedy

133. Id. at 2.
134. Bassett, supra note 52; Frank, supra note 25; Jed Handelsman Shugerman, In
Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v. Massey Should Have Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529
(2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through
Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010);
Brian P. Leitch, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: A Proposal to Conform
Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1982).
135. See Abramson, supra note 56; Abramson, supra note 42.
136. Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for
Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010).
137. Abramson, supra note 42, at 1080.
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explained that states “may adopt recusal standards more rigorous
than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these
standards.”138 In other words, according to Justice Kennedy, the way
to create and foster an appearance of a fair and impartial judiciary is
by tightening the recusal framework, not by regulating the judicial
conduct that creates the appearance in the first place.
The same reasoning continued in Caperton, where Justice
Kennedy, this time writing for the Court, said that the “appearance
of impropriety” standard is “[t]he principal safeguard against judicial
campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the
fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.”139 Again, any
damage to the public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of
the courts is to be remedied by imposing a strict recusal standard
requiring disqualification of judges for even an appearance of bias.140
The following chart (Figure 1) provides a visual illustration of
the “getting to recusal” approach. It shows the four possible recusal
decisions that a judge may reach. There are two correct decisions: a
judge may recuse when there is appearance of partiality, and nonrecuse when there is no appearance of impartiality. There are also
two incorrect decisions: a judge may recuse when there is no
appearance of partiality, and a judge may decide not to recuse when
there is such an appearance. Under the traditional “getting to
recusal” framework, the focus has generally been on getting the
judge out of the two “wrong” boxes141 and into the two “right”
ones. This Article argues that simply getting it right is not enough to
create an appearance of impartiality.

138. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
139. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) (emphasis
added) (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae at 4, 11).
140. Lower court judges have mirrored the Court’s rationale. In a recent case, the Eighth
Circuit explained: “[W]e think the Constitution favors stricter recusal standards and fewer
speech restrictions.” Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 841 (8th Cir. 2010).
141. In particular, the upper right box has caused the most concern. Although the judge
in the lower left box wrongly recuses when there is no appearance of bias, most commentators
today do not view this mistake as particularly problematic. This was not always so as courts had
at one time held that it is “a judge’s duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is
equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.” United States v. Edwards,
334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307
F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). The duty to sit has now been
abandoned for most state and federal judges.
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Figure 1.
Correct Decision
Appearance of Bias: Yes
Recusal: Yes

Wrong Decision
Appearance of Bias: Yes
Recusal: No

Wrong Decision
Appearance of Bias: No
Recusal: Yes

Correct Decision
Appearance of Bias: No
Recusal: No

B. Why Recusal May Not Be the Solution
In the following pages, I suggest that the underlying assumption
that a correct recusal decision fully restores public confidence and
entirely eliminates the appearance of bias may need to be
reconsidered. This may be the case even when a judge correctly
concludes (a) that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned
and recuses, or (b) that his impartiality could not be questioned and
declines to recuse. There are two reasons for this surprising assertion.
1. Too little, too late
The first reason why the “getting to recusal” approach fails to
foster an appearance of impartiality is because the focus on
appearances comes too late. Because appearances are considered only
at the time of the final recusal decision, judges are free to engage in
conduct that ultimately creates an appearance of partiality, and only
then, once the appearance has been created, is the judge expected to
recuse.142 This means that by the time the recusal decision is
ultimately made and publicized, the public has already observed the
conduct and the events that negatively affect its perception of the
judiciary and formed its own, often negative, opinions about judicial
impartiality. Recusal is intended as the solution to the problem; by
requiring the judge to step aside, any appearance of impartiality is

142. It is important to highlight that the underlying conduct that is the focus of this
Article is not improper by itself, as judicial codes already prohibit judges from engaging in such
conduct. Rather, the problem arises only when a particular litigant, or a particular case, appears
in front of the judge.
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thought to be eliminated and public confidence in the court
restored.
Research done by political scientists James Gibson and Gregory
Caldeira suggests that things are not quite so simple.143 Gibson and
Caldeira set out to study recusal’s effect on restoring the public’s
confidence in the judgment of a particular case or in the judiciary
itself. They used vignettes modeled after the facts in Caperton to
determine whether citizens believed that “the recipient of the
campaign support can serve as a fair and impartial judge and whether
the West Virginia Supreme Court itself is a legitimate institution.”144
Among the independent variables that Gibson and Caldeira
manipulated was the judge’s recusal decision—did the judge step
aside or did the judge cast his vote in the case despite the calls for
recusal. The authors hypothesized, just as scholars and politicians for
centuries had assumed, that “where a conflict of interest exists,
recusal will rescue the legitimacy of the court.”145
But this assumption turned out to be wrong, at least in part.
Instead, the study revealed that the “effect of recusals is not to
restore the court/judge to the level of support that exists when no
conflict of interest is present.”146 That is, the recusal decision did not
counteract the appearance of partiality that was created when a
judicial candidate accepted contributions from a future litigant. This
research confirms that the traditional assumption that recusals can
neutralize conflicts of interests may not be entirely correct, and that
“recusal is only a weak palliative for conflicts of interests created by
contributions.”147 In other words, even when a judge on a multimember court recuses, the public’s confidence in that court is only
partially restored, and the public’s perception of partiality and bias is
not completely erased.
These results may be surprising to some, but they also make a
great deal of sense. Sticking to the judicial election context, we know
that campaign contributions have a negative effect on institutional

143. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest,
and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals?, (Oct. 19,
2009) (on file with the author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428723 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink).
144. Id. at 11.
145. Id. at 13.
146. Id. at 32.
147. Id. at 3.
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legitimacy.148 This concern is not without reason, since data suggest
that judges are more likely to decide in favor of their contributor.149
Furthermore, the public may be reasonably concerned that other
contributions were made that simply have not yet come to light. It is
much too optimistic, then, to expect that institutional legitimacy will
be restored when apparently biased judges recuse themselves. To
paraphrase Mr. Darcy, the public’s good opinion of the judiciary,
once lost, is lost forever (or, at the very least, is not entirely restored
by judicial recusal).150 In short, concentrating on the actual recusal
decision in order to create or maximize the appearance of
impartiality may make up only part of the picture, and our focus on
appearances must come before the decision maker makes a recusal
decision.
To see how this problem operates in the real world, let us take a
look at what circumstances may lead to the public’s loss of
confidence in the judiciary. The trigger may be a judge’s interest in
one of the parties or in a certain outcome in litigation, as it was in
Tumey and Lavoie, or it may be the judge’s relationship with a
litigant or an attorney for one of the parties, as it was in Caperton
and the Scalia-Cheney duck hunting incident. An example of the
former was recently on display in the challenge to the federal drilling
moratorium in the wake of the BP disaster in the Gulf. Judge Martin
Feldman, a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of
Louisiana overturned a six-month moratorium on drilling that halted
the approval of any new permits and suspended deep-water drilling
at existing exploratory wells in the Gulf. It was later discovered that
Judge Feldman held energy stocks in numerous drilling and offshore
energy companies, including Transocean and Halliburton. After
Judge Feldman failed to recuse himself, the case received significant
media attention as numerous environmental groups sought
recusal.151 But putting aside the judge’s recusal decision,152 the
148. Id.
149. Shepherd, supra note 111.
150. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 94 (Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., 2010) (1813)
(“My good opinion once lost is lost forever.”).
151. The Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Defenders of Wildlife
were among the groups that sought Judge Feldman’s recusal. Tennille Tracy, Groups Seek
Judge’s Removal in Drilling-Moratorium Case, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343361857605650.html.
152. In other words, let us assume that a reasonable person could question Judge
Feldman’s impartiality and that recusal was indeed required by 28 U.S.C. § 455—a reasonable
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relevant question for this Article is whether a different substantive
recusal standard—or even a different recusal decision—would have
restored public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. I
believe the answer is “no.”
When the federal drilling moratorium was litigated, the Los
Angeles Times reported that
[S]even of the 12 federal judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana
already have cited potential conflicts of interest in bowing out of
cases brought by fishermen, charter operators, tourist services and
families of those killed in the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico.153

In the Fifth Circuit, it was discovered that most judges held some
interest in oil companies, or had other close ties to the oil
industry.154 As a result, recusals in cases involving the oil industry
have become so common in the Fifth Circuit that the court was
unable to reach a quorum to review a case brought by victims of
Hurricane Katrina.155 It is precisely these types of interests that may
create the impression of a biased and partial judiciary, and once the
public has perceived judicial bias or a quid pro quo between a judge
and a potential litigant, the recusal decision, no matter what the
substantive standard and no matter what the decision, cannot fully
restore the public’s confidence in the courts.
The Gibson & Caldeira study is the first of its kind. Very little is
known about how the recusal decision affects public perception of
judicial impartiality. Because of the centuries-old assumption that
recusal restores public confidence in the court, scholars have largely
ignored this issue. My hope is that Gibson & Caldeira’s findings,
together with this Article, will spur further study of how the public
perceives judicial recusal decisions, and the extent to which even a
correct recusal decision may still leave the reputation of the judiciary
in doubt.

assumption given the controversy that arose following Judge Feldman’s decision.
153. Carol J. Williams, Judges’ Hands Tied By Oil Industry Interests, L.A. TIMES, June 23,
2010, at A2.
154. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL GUSHER: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S TIES TO OIL,
http://www.afj.org/about-afj/press/fifth_circuit_judges_report.pdf
(summarizing
investments and interests of Fifth Circuit judges in the gas and oil industries) (last visited Aug.
18, 2011).
155. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010).
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2. One case at a time
The second reason why focusing excessively on the substantive
appearance-based recusal standard and considering appearance only
at the time of the recusal decision fails to foster an appearance of
impartiality is that one-time, one-off recusal decisions are not as
effective in maximizing public confidence in the judiciary and the
legitimacy of the courts as broad structural reforms. In a wide range
of fields, scholars have observed that effective reform often requires
structural changes rather than relying on favorable outcomes one
case at a time.156 When recusal decisions are made on an ad hoc basis,
public confidence in the judiciary is undermined. This is partly
because the public does not know what led to a particular decision,
and partly because, as discussed in greater detail below, the public
only learns of a limited set of recusal decisions, which skews its
perception.157 This is true even when the challenged judge properly
assesses whether her impartiality may reasonably be questioned, and
even when the judge ultimately recuses herself.
It is generally understood that “[a]s a matter of legal technique,
it is far preferable to have sound general principles rather than ad hoc
rules, or even worse, a ‘myriad of single instances.’”158 But when it
comes to recusal, ad hoc decisions are the norm, and each recusal
decision becomes a one-time proposition, good for that day only.
There is great variation from judge to judge in how they resolve
recusal questions, and this variation not only leads to inconsistent
results but also leads the public to question the fairness and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Another reason why considering appearances on a case-by-case
basis is problematic is that, at the point of recusal, judges generally
know the parties, the lawyers, and the nature of the particular
dispute from which they are asked to recuse. Of course, this
information is not supposed to matter to the judge making the
recusal decision, but it is hard to know whether it filters into judicial
recusal analysis. For example, if the case involves a subject-matter
close to the judge’s heart—let’s say the judge is particularly

156. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 25 (2008).
157. The public’s lack of knowledge is especially true because judges rarely publish an
opinion explaining their recusal decision.
158. HAMMOND, supra note 116, at 6.
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interested in expanding the scope of the First Amendment—there is
a risk that the judge will decide not to recuse because she wants to
cast a vote in the case, despite the fact that she may have a close
relationship with one of the attorneys, or despite the fact that one of
the litigants contributed heavily to her campaign. As Part IV argues
below, the solution to this problem is that legislators must consider
appearances ex ante, without knowing the particular circumstances in
which recusal may arise in the future.
Congress and the courts have acknowledged the importance of
appearances when it comes to judicial legitimacy. Now, they must
come to realize that structural problems should be remedied by
large-scale systemic solutions, not in a case-by-case fashion.159
Recusal statutes and judicial codes are unable to protect judicial
legitimacy and the appearance of impartiality as long as the
appearances are considered in an ad hoc fashion. In the recusal
context in particular, there are two reasons why recusal decisions in
individual cases do not create an appearance of impartiality: (1) the
role of the media in publicizing non-recusal decisions, and (2) the
difficulties inherent in the substantive recusal standard.
a. Judicial recusal and the media. The media plays an everincreasing and important role in the way the public perceives judicial
disqualification and judicial impartiality. When it comes to judicial
disqualification, only cases of non-recusal generally receive media
scrutiny and public recognition. This is part of the reason why
legislative and judicial reliance on judicial recusal decisions to create
an appearance of impartiality, or even to eliminate the appearance of
partiality, is misguided—when a judge steps aside, the public rarely
knows it.
One need only look at the controversies that have arisen in the
last few years alone—Justice Scalia’s nonrecusal in the case involving
Dick Cheney, Justice Benjamin’s nonrecusal in Caperton, and Judge
Feldman’s nonrecusal in Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar.160 But
one is hard-pressed to identify any high-profile cases of recusal. This
is because recusal often takes place under the radar, without an
explanation or an opinion from the recusing judge, and without
159. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton,
123 HARV. L. REV. 80 (2009) (highlighting the difficulties inherent in the Court’s approach
to addressing structural problems relating to judicial impartiality).
160. 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010).
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media scrutiny. For example, decisions of the Supreme Court often
indicate that one or more Justices did not participate in the case with
a simple note that reads “Justice _______ did not participate in the
decision.”161 Unlike the criticism and scrutiny that often accompanies
nonrecusal decisions, these judicial recusals are generally ignored by
the media and therefore cannot increase (or even affect) public
perception of judicial impartiality.
In the rare circumstances when judicial recusals (as opposed to
nonrecusals) actually receive public scrutiny, the attention is
generally negative, often focusing on the underlying judicial conduct
that necessitated recusal in the first place. In other words, even when
judges fully appreciate that their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, their decision to recuse, just like their decision not to
recuse, often is to the detriment of public confidence in the judiciary.
This is because it highlights the conduct that created the appearance
of impartiality in the first place. I touched on one example earlier in
the Article: the media coverage of Fifth Circuit judges, and their
frequent recusal in cases involving the oil industry. Despite judicial
recusals in those cases, the reputation of the judiciary likely suffered
from the disclosure that many, if not most, Fifth Circuit judges have
connections to the oil and gas industry.
Another prominent recent example of a recusal that received
largely negative attention involved Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski. In 2008, Judge Kozinski was presiding over an obscenity
trial when it was reported that Kozinski’s personal website contained
explicit pornographic material.162 When the reports became public,
Judge Kozinski recused himself from the case. Following the recusal,
the public commentary was overwhelmingly negative and critical of
the judge, focusing on the underlying conduct rather than on the
recusal decision itself. Here again, a recusal decision intended to
create the appearance of impartiality and fairness potentially had the
opposite effect.163

161. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 129 S.
Ct. 2592 (2009) (in which Justice Stevens did not participate because he owns beachfront
property in Florida).
162. Obscenity Trial Suspended After Judge Posts Sex Images Online, FOX NEWS, June 12,
2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,365701,00.html.
163. Of course, this case is not typical and the salacious nature of the facts contributed to
the negative publicity.
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Aside from the fact that nonrecusal decisions receive far greater
public scrutiny and attention than recusal decisions, there is yet
another reason why even a correct recusal decision, one that properly
considers public perception and appearance, does not promote an
appearance of impartiality. This is because the public’s perception of
the underlying events is often skewed by the “lens of the media.” To
apply the appearance-based disqualification test correctly under the
federal disqualification statute (28 U.S.C. § 455) or the state judicial
codes, a judge must determine whether an impartial and objective
observer, knowing all the facts, might question the judge’s
impartiality and reasonably perceive an appearance of bias. But the
public rarely, if ever, has access to all the facts that underpin a recusal
controversy. These facts are often complex and may involve longstanding relationships between the judge and a litigant, or the judge
and an attorney. While the superficial level of knowledge that the
public may have perceived, or learned from media coverage, may
lead a reasonable member of the public to question the judge’s
impartiality, a greater understanding of the judiciary and the
situation may negate any appearance of impropriety.
As a result of this tension, the challenged judge may correctly
determine that recusal is unnecessary because no reasonable person
knowing all of the facts could question the judge’s impartiality, while
at the same time the public perceives bias because it is basing its
conclusions on a different set of facts.164 Once again, we may be left
with a “correct” recusal decision that simultaneously damages the
reputation of the judiciary and harms the appearance of impartiality.
b. The appearances of appearances. Furthermore, in an ironic
twist, the substantive appearance-based recusal standard itself may
damage the reputation of the judiciary and minimize its legitimacy
for two reasons.

164. This was the issue raised by Justice Scalia in his recusal memorandum following the
duck hunting trip with Vice President Cheney. In seeking Scalia’s recusal, the Sierra Club
argued that “[b]ecause the American public, as reflected in the nation’s newspaper editorials,
has unanimously concluded that there is an appearance of favoritism, any objective observer
would be compelled to conclude that Justice Scalia’s impartiality has been questioned.”
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004). Justice Scalia identified
numerous factual mistakes in the editorials and argued that the editorials should play no role in
determining whether a reasonable observer would question Scalia’s impartiality. Id. at 924
(“Such a blast of largely inaccurate and uninformed opinion cannot determine the recusal
question.”).
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First, an appearance-based substantive recusal standard may be
inconsistent with the practice of judicial elections. Jed Shugerman
suggests that a slightly ambiguous standard like the “appearance of
bias” has an advantage insofar as it may lead judges to “err in favor
of recusing themselves.”165 And it is undoubtedly true that some
judges do err on the side of caution, and step aside simply to avoid
any controversy even when they do not believe their partiality could
reasonably be questioned. But, thirty-nine states elect some or all of
their judges, and the public overwhelmingly prefers elected judges
over appointed ones, despite concerns about bias towards campaign
contributors.166 As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence in
White, judges who must run for reelection “are likely to feel that
they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every
publicized case.”167 Studies show that even minor contributions, even
rejected contributions, may create an appearance of partiality
requiring recusal.168 An aggressive recusal standard may defeat the
very purpose of electing judges and could actually harm judicial
legitimacy by depriving citizens of an opportunity to choose their
judges for the cases that matter most.169
There is another reason why the appearance-based recusal
standard may itself be damaging to the public perception of the
judiciary. The “appearance of bias” test is not a model of clarity and
precision, with some commentators going so far as to call the
standard unworkable at best, and a sham at worst.170 This problem
becomes more acute as high-profile accusations of judicial bias and
partiality become more and more common, as they have in the
recent months. As the dissenters in Caperton argued, an increase in
the number of allegations that judges are biased will further “erode

165. Shugerman, supra note 134, at 550.
166. James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006, THE BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUST. (2007), http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf.
167. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 536, 788–89 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
168. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 143.
169. A recent study showed that in 60 percent of the cases heard by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, “at least one of the litigants, attorneys, or firms involved had contributed to
the election campaign of at least one justice.” Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/selection/jnc/docs/
AJS-PAstudy3-18-10.pdf (last updated 2009).
170. See Rotunda, supra note 117.
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public confidence” in the fairness and integrity of the courts.171
While these predictions may be overblown,172 one cannot help but
wonder whether an expansive recusal standard and increased
publicity for recusal motions may adversely affect the public
perception of the judiciary by undermining confidence in the fairness
and impartiality of the American judiciary. This is in part because it is
so easy to allege an appearance of impropriety and so hard to
determine whether there in fact is an appearance of impropriety.
When recusal standards are too nebulous, and if allegations of an
appearance of bias become the norm in litigation, recusal law
becomes too vulnerable to manipulation and rather than furthering
the appearance of impartiality, may only harm it. Additional research
is necessary to confirm the suspicion that over-recusal, and excessive
demands for recusal, can weaken the judiciary’s reputation. But at
least one commentator suggests that this may indeed be the case.173
IV. EX ANTE REGULATION AND RECUSAL PROCEDURE
This Part proposes two changes to American recusal
jurisprudence intended to increase public confidence in the
impartiality of the courts and maximize judicial legitimacy. First, I
will argue that when possible, ex ante regulation of judicial conduct
that prevents the appearance of bias from arising in the first place
would be the best method for creating and maintaining an
appearance of judicial impartiality and fairness. Second, I propose
that appearance-based regulation of recusal procedures may in fact
do more to maximize the appearance of impartiality than the
substantive recusal standards.
A. Ex Ante Regulation of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Elections
There is vast literature examining the tension between ex ante
and ex post consideration in creating legal rules and standards. The
advantage of an ex post approach is that it permits greater accuracy
and tailoring while ex ante considerations often allow for greater
clarity. But if it is true that recusal comes too late to restore public

171. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
172. See Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2010).
173. Rotunda, supra note 117.
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confidence in the judiciary once an appearance of bias has been
created—if ex post recusal decisions are not the best way to
“promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
process”174—then the most important recusal related jurisprudential
changes are not actually changes to recusal rules at all. Rather, they
are changes to other rules regulating judges—rules of judicial
conduct and judicial selection—that explicitly consider how certain
judicial behavior may influence the perception of judicial impartiality.
For judicial regulation to truly have an effect on the appearance of
impartiality, we must increase our regulation of the very conduct that
creates the appearance problem in the first place, avoiding even the
creation of an appearance of bias. In other words, when it comes to
considering the appearance of impartiality and fairness, the best time
to think about recusal is before the appearance of bias arises.
By pushing back the time when appearances are considered we
can avoid much of the damage that the judiciary suffers as a result of
improper judicial conduct while eliminating the need for recusal
rules and decisions to carry the heavy load of remedying the
problem. Under the proposed ex ante regime, policymakers must do
whatever possible to minimize the need for potential future recusals,
as well as the number of calls for recusal. Implementation of better
ex ante rules can reduce the number of future Caperton-like appeals
and ease the dissenting Justices’ concerns that the Caperton decision
will lead to a flood of new recusal motions. Greater ex ante
regulation of judicial conduct and judicial elections also helps
alleviate, if not eliminate, the “one case at a time” problem identified
in Part III.B.2. While judges may not be in the best position to
engage in the line drawing required in individual recusal cases, ex
ante regulation allows the line drawing to be done on a general,
systemic level by legislators or bar associations. In other words,
adopting an ex ante approach to judicial recusal “eliminates the
burden on judges to determine where the line for recusal is
drawn.”175
Furthermore, ex ante regulation of judicial conduct is preferable
to ex post recusal-based regulation because the latter method misses

174. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (citing S.
Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974)).
175. Symposium, Session 1: One Symptom of a Serious Problem: Caperton v. Massey, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 587 (2010) (transcript of comments of Kathleen Sullivan).
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the conduct that negatively affects the judiciary but that may never
otherwise come to light. For example, in an election context, the
losing candidate’s conduct may harm the reputation of the judiciary
but would never be challenged on recusal. Likewise, recusal is not
well designed to address a situation where a judge develops a
relationship with a particular contributor, and while that particular
contributor never appears as a litigant in front of the judge, making
recusal unnecessary, the contributor may still have an interest in the
outcome of other cases heard by the judge. This “different litigant,
same interest” problem is extremely difficult to address with recusal
but may still damage the appearance of judicial impartiality and harm
the reputation of the judiciary.
I propose four categories where ex ante rules could assist in
avoiding damage to judicial legitimacy and the appearance of
partiality. Within each category, I will discuss my proposed rule and
provide an example of how the rule would operate in the context of
recent recusal-related controversies: (1) judicial elections, (2) judicial
friendships and relationships, (3) judicial financial interests, and (4)
extrajudicial activities.
1. Judicial elections
a. The problem. We start at the beginning of the judge’s career:
judicial selection.176 The process by which a judge is selected is one
of the key factors in the public’s perception of the courts.177
especially important are the methods of judicial selection and the
campaign environment.178 In fact, the element of judicial elections
that has the greatest effect on the public’s perception of the judiciary
is campaign fundraising.179 As mentioned earlier, the public’s
concerns about the impartiality of judges receiving contributions
from litigants are well founded. Recent studies confirm that judges

176. Of course, recusal may be necessary as a result of a judge’s conduct before judicial
selection. For example, if a judge worked as a partner at a law firm before joining the bench, as
many judges have, those friendships cannot be regulated by an ex ante scheme. Ex post recusal
rules, like those contained in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) are intended to address these situations.
177. Cann & Yates, supra note 15, at 316.
178. Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate
Voter Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 645 (2009).
179. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 69 (2008).
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are more likely to rule for those who helped fund their campaigns.180
Because ex post recusal cannot fully restore judicial legitimacy, it is
important that we regulate conduct during judicial elections in order
to avoid the harm in the first place. In other words, legislatures must
regulate judicial elections to ensure that election-related practices
and conduct do not damage the appearance of impartiality by
pushing back the time frame for when we look at appearance—all the
way back to the election itself.
In Caperton, recusal was necessary because one of the litigants
spent extravagant amounts of money to elect the very judge who
would later rule on that litigant’s case.181 The damage to the
reputation of the judiciary is done at this early stage. The very fact
that a future or current litigant helps a judge get elected gives rise to
the appearance of judicial bias and partiality.
And Caperton does not present a unique fact pattern. Most
judges in the United States stand for election and must raise the
funds for their candidacies from the parties that they may eventually
meet in the courtroom. For example, Avery v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Company182 was a class action suit for breach of
contract in which the plaintiffs alleged that State Farm violated its
duty to restore automobiles to their original pre-crash condition by
using automobile parts salvaged from other damaged vehicles.183
After the lower courts found in favor of the plaintiffs, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed. Like Caperton, Avery was decided shortly
after an election cycle for the Illinois Supreme Court. During his
campaign for the court, Justice Lloyd Karmeier made numerous probusiness statements.184 Karmeier also received over $350,000 in
contributions from State Farm’s employees and its lawyers.185 After

180. Michael S. Kang & Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 69 (2011)
(“[E]very dollar of direct contributions from business groups is associated with an increase in
the probability that the judges will vote for business litigants.”).
181. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257. In sum, the litigant
spent about three million dollars.
182. 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
183. Id. at 811.
184. See Goldberg et al., supra note 106, at 510.
185. Brief for 12 Organizations Concerned About the Influence of Money on Judicial
Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Avery v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (No. 05-842).
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being elected to the bench, Justice Karmeier declined to recuse
himself and cast the deciding vote in favor of the defendant.
These two cases are just a small part of a larger problem. In fact,
elected judges deciding cases involving their contributors has
reached epidemic proportions. For example, a recent study showed
that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 2008 and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law
firm that contributed to the campaign of at least one of the
justices.186
In one word, the problem here is “money.”187 In response to
Caperton, some states have begun to put in place ex post recusal
reforms.188 But to really get at appearances of judicial partiality, states
should create ex ante rules focusing on their election practices.
b. The solution. What specific rules must be reformed? Most of
the damage described above comes from judicial contributions and
independent expenditures by individuals or groups that are likely to
come in front of the elected judge as litigants. Therefore, legislators
must better regulate the flow of money from contributors to judicial
candidates by (1) eliminating or limiting direct contributions and
independent expenditures for judicial elections altogether, (2)
implementing a public financing scheme for judicial elections, or (3)
requiring that all contributions to judicial candidates be
anonymous.189

186. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributions and the Pennsylvania
Supreme
Court,
THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST.
(Mar.
11,
2010),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/campaign_contributions_and_the_pennsylvani
a_supreme_court/.
187. Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They Live Together? 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 217 (2010) (“Money is changing judicial elections and threatens to erode
trust in the courts themselves.”).
188. See, e.g., New York’s new rule prohibiting elected judges from deciding cases
involving litigants that had contributed $2,500 or more to their campaigns. See Rules
Governing the Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS § 151.1, available at
http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1.
189. This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating
judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in White, commentators predicted that most regulation of
judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts
struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After
Caperton, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James
Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04
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Requiring anonymous contributions is a particularly appealing
proposal because such a requirement likely would not be subject to
many of the constitutional objections that a proposal to eliminate or
limit contributions altogether would be.190 It is difficult to
understand why judges need to know the identity of their
contributors, and why contributors must let judges know that they
have contributed, other than to curry favor with the judges.191 A few
states experimented with anonymous contributions for judicial
elections in the 1970s, but the idea has not caught on.192 Today, this
proposal may sound strange given the trend towards more
disclosure, not less. But it is time for all states that elect judges to
consider implementing this approach to combat the problem of
judicial bias towards their contributors.
Implementation of this proposal need not be overly complicated.
Obviously, if judges were able to discover the identity of their
contributors after the election, then the anonymity requirement
would be futile. But it still seems likely that a successful anonymity
scheme could be implemented. Perhaps the best approach was
suggested by Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, who proposed a similar
regime that would operate through a privatized system of blind
trusts.193 Under this regime campaigns could no longer accept
contributions directly from individuals or companies. Rather, all

(2010) (concluding that Caperton “provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform
efforts”). In fact, Caperton’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure
framework from Buckley v. Valeo suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections
in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.
190. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In the years since Buckley, there has
been a tremendous amount of legal scholarship examining the question of whether money is
speech. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953
(2011); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663, 688–89 (1997); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE
L.J. 1001 (1976).
191. For an excellent discussion of potential ethical issues involved in attorney
contributions to judges, see Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The
Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011).
192. See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving
Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 473 n.130 (1988) (noting that the ten
adopting states were Arkansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
193. Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 853 (1998).
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donations to candidates (and political parties) would have to be
made by mail to established blind trusts.194
2. Judicial relationships
a. The problem. The second category that is a frequent source of
recusal controversies is judicial relationships with friends. This can
involve close friendships as well as romantic relationships with
attorneys and litigants. Of course, these friendships are often
unavoidable and cannot be prohibited outright. But particularly
troublesome interactions between judges and their friends and
colleagues should be regulated.
One of the most famous recent incidents was Justice Scalia’s
infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney. After
details of the trip came to light, calls for recusal reform grew to a
fever pitch. The American Bar Association’s Joint Commission to
Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct considered revisions
to the judicial code, and two Democrats on the House Judiciary
Committee called for hearings to amend federal recusal law. Then, as
always, the focus was on the final recusal decision; namely, Justice
Scalia’s decision that his impartiality could not reasonably be
questioned. But, can we foster an appearance of impartiality when it
comes to judicial friends through ex ante recusal reform?
b. The solution. There is little scholarship on regulation of judicial
friendships,195 and even fewer rules regulating judges’ relationships
with their friends and colleagues. What little scholarship exists
supports the ex post “getting to recusal” approach that focuses on
the substantive recusal rules (which I identified earlier).196 But, if our
main goal is to maximize the appearance of judicial impartiality, then
it is important to amend rules concerning friendships or interaction
between judges and litigants rather than focusing on recusal alone.
In other words, the ex ante rules that I propose do more to regulate
the interaction between judges and litigants (or likely future

194. Id.
195. But see Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a Per
Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 584–614 (2006) (proposing
a bright-line recusal rule for cases involving a judge’s close friends).
196. Id.

988

DO NOT DELETE

943

10/15/2011 1:15 PM

Making Appearances Matter

litigants) where interaction would create an appearance of partiality,
even if the judge might eventually have an opportunity to recuse.
For example, the rules of judicial conduct could be revised to
prohibit any interaction between judges and current litigants, or
litigants that are likely to appear in front of the judge within the next
year. Admittedly, it is often difficult to predict which litigants will
appear in front of the judge. Furthermore, it is important that judges
remain active members of the community and participate in bar
functions like Inns of Court. At the very least, however, when a party
is litigating a case in the district court, the appellate judges likely to
review any future appeal should refrain from interacting with that
party until the case has concluded. This prophylactic measure is more
likely to increase the appearance of impartiality and judicial
legitimacy than asking the judge to recuse himself based on the
appearance of impropriety.
States should also consider implementing ex ante rules regulating
certain types of friendships and relationships that should be
prohibited outright. For example, judges should be prohibited from
having romantic or sexual relationships with litigants that frequently
appear in front of them.197 Just last year, a controversy broke out in
Texas when a former judge and a former district attorney in Texas
admitted that they had engaged in a lengthy affair. Both had
participated in the trial of a man who was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.198 Similarly, a number of states have recently
considered whether judges can be friends with lawyers on social
networking sites like LinkedIn or Facebook.199
While these regulations may seem simplistic, invasive, or perhaps
downright silly, these are precisely the types of ex ante regulations
that can prevent situations like Justice Scalia’s duck-hunting
controversy from damaging the reputation of the judiciary.
I do not propose that judges live in isolation, shielding
themselves from any interaction with potential lawyers and litigants
who may appear before them. Judicial selection mechanisms in the
United States, whereby judges get to their position because of

197. Of course, this prohibition would not apply to judges who are married or related to
those parties, but current recusal rules already require automated disqualification in those cases.
198. See Steve Mills, Judge’s Affair Complicates Death Row Case, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10,
2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/10/nation/na-execution10.
199. John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2009, at A25.
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contacts and friendships formed in school, private practice, and
public service, do not permit such an approach.200 But when one
litigant shares a close friendship or an intimate relationship with the
judge, the appearance of impartiality suffers. Restricting these
relationships while cases are pending is a reasonable burden.
3. Judicial financial interests
a. The problem. American recusal law takes a hard-line approach
to recusal when it comes to judges’ financial interests: a judge must
recuse himself from a case if he has any financial interest in a litigant,
even if the ownership interest is only a single share of stock.201 But
again, this is an ex post rule; there is no ex ante prohibition on stock
ownership in the first place.
We saw an example of the problems with the ex post approach
last summer when the Fifth Circuit failed to reach a quorum in a case
because too many judges were required to recuse themselves.202
Under the “getting to recusal” approach, the fact the judges recused
themselves should eliminate any appearance of partiality. But this
situation demonstrates why the ex post solutions alone are imperfect
and insufficient.
b. The solution. If damage to the judiciary’s reputation cannot be
remedied by recusal alone, then it is important to create ex ante rules
about stock ownership or financial interest when parties (or those
interests) are likely to come in front of the court. Rather than
permitting stock ownership for any company or industry that the
judge wants and then requiring recusal or divestment on the back
end, judges should simply be prohibited from owning certain stock.
It is not unreasonable to require that judges invest only in mutual

200. A federal judge famously quipped that a “U.S. District judge is someone who went
to school with a future U.S. senator, and a U.S. Circuit judge is someone whose college
roommate became a U.S. senator.” Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections:
Maintaining Respectability in the Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). Generally, a computer program tracks judges’ stock
ownership, and judges are automatically excluded from hearing cases involving corporations
featured in judges’ investment portfolios. For a criticism of the rule, see Alex Kozinski, The
Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2004) (“The idea that I would
give up my honest judgment in a case for a few dollars is beyond silly—it’s ludicrous and
insulting. So many of the things contained within the Canons, the ones most talked about, are
wholly irrelevant in practice. They make no difference at all.”).
202. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2010).
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funds to ensure that their money is not closely tied to any particular
company or industry.
For example, an ex ante rule prohibiting judges in the Fifth
Circuit from owning any direct interests in the oil industry would
not unduly burden judges and would obviate the need for frequent
recusals in cases that often come before the court. This would do
much more for the appearance of fairness and the reputation of the
judiciary than perpetual recusals.
4. Extrajudicial involvement
a. The problem. Another problem is participation by judges in
partisan activities that may create an impression that judges decide
cases with an eye towards those partisan interests. Canon 4 of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges does not appear to
prohibit this type of conduct.203 A recent example demonstrates this
concern.
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Citizens United,204
reports surfaced that Justices Scalia and Thomas attended seminars
and a political retreat sponsored by the energy giant and conservative
bankroller Koch Industries. According to a Koch Industries mailing,
the purpose of these retreats is to raise funds “to review strategies for
combating the multitude of public policies that threaten to destroy
America as we know it.”205 The seminar was held shortly before the
case was added to the Supreme Court docket, but suggestions arose

203. Canon 4 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges reads:
A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including law-related pursuits and
civic, charitable, educational, religious, social, financial, fiduciary, and governmental
activities, and may speak, write, lecture, and teach on both law-related and nonlegal
subjects. However, a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that
detract from the dignity of the judge’s office, interfere with the performance of the
judge’s official duties, reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, lead to frequent
disqualification, or violate the limitations set forth below.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES canon 4 (2009). Although the second clause prohibits
the judge from engaging in some extrajudicial activities if they “reflect adversely on the judge’s
impartiality” or “lead to frequent disqualification,” this rule is rarely enforced, and judges
generally decide for themselves whether their conduct runs afoul of the prohibition. Often, the
judge’s impartiality cannot be questioned until a particular case arises. Moreover, as mentioned
earlier, the Code of Conduct does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme Court.
See supra note 54.
204. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
205. Kate Zernike, Secretive Republican Donors Are Planning Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 2010, at A18.
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immediately that Scalia and Thomas’s ruling in Citizens United may
have been affected by their time with Koch officials.206 Nothing is
known about the discussions that took place at the seminar, but, as
noted by Common Cause, the primary group that argued that Scalia
and Thomas should have recused themselves, the ruling furthered
the interests of Koch Industries.207
b. The solution. Because there are no clear rules in place to
prevent judges from being associated, even closely associated, with
people, politicians, or political activists, ex post recusal is generally
considered the best, perhaps the only, solution to this kind of judicial
conduct. This type of conduct can and should be regulated ex ante,
before the reputation of the court suffers and judicial impartiality is
questioned.208
Just as with the regulation of judicial relationships and judicial
financial holdings, judges should not be permitted to attend
functions, retreats, or any other activities sponsored by groups with a
direct stake either in pending litigation or in litigation that frequently
arises in front of the court. Such flat bans may seem draconian, but,
to the extent that they increase the appearance of judicial impartiality
and independence, they are worth the effort.
B. Recusal Procedures
Regulation of the underlying judicial conduct and
implementation of ex ante rules that prevent the appearance of
impartiality or bias from arising in the first place is the best approach
to maximize judicial legitimacy and public confidence in the courts.
But sometimes it is impossible to prevent recusals altogether no
matter how well-tailored our ex ante rules may be. For example, no
amount of ex ante regulation can prevent recusal-related
controversies when judges were personally involved in passing or

206. See Eric Lichtblau, Advocacy Group Says Justices May Have Conflict in Campaign
Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A15.
207. Id.
208. It should be noted that, to the extent the conduct itself creates an appearance of
impropriety or impartiality, such conduct is already prohibited by the Code of Conduct, at
least for all judges other than members of the United States Supreme Court. See Neumann,
supra note 57. The ex ante proposals in this Part, and throughout this paper, are intended to
regulate conduct that does not create an appearance of impartiality until a particular case arises
requiring recusal.
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defending the very law in question.209 Furthermore, at least in the
United States, judges become judges because of their relationships,
friendships, and connections with influential political leaders and
members of the community established over many years. Those
connections and relationships cannot be prevented. Neither can
judges erase years, sometimes decades, of other experience, including
private practice and public service. It is precisely in these
circumstances that recusal law must be at its strongest.
An example of a situation where ex ante solutions are
theoretically possible but practically infeasible occurs when it is not
the judge’s previous conduct that leads to damage to the appearance
of impartiality, but that of the judge’s spouse. Two recent recusal
controversies illustrate this problem.
First, Ninth Circuit judge Stephen Reinhardt was asked to recuse
himself from hearing the appeal of a same-sex marriage case210
because his wife, Ramona Ripston, the executive director of the
ACLU of Southern California, was consulted about whether the case
should have been brought in the first place.211 Appellants argued that
Reinhardt must recuse himself because his “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”212 Judge Reinhardt denied the motion.213
Second, controversy has erupted over the activities of Virginia
Thomas, the wife of Justice Clarence Thomas. After allegations that
Mrs. Thomas has reported ties to anti-health care initiatives, House
Democrats called for Justice Thomas to recuse himself from any legal
challenge to the Affordable Care Act.214 Legal challenges to the Act
have not yet reached the Supreme Court,215 and it is not yet known

209. During Elena Kagan’s confirmation hearings, for example, Justice Kagan was
questioned about whether or not she would recuse herself from a likely Supreme Court
challenge to the recently enacted health-care reform law. See Laura Meckler, Republicans Push
Kagan on Health-Care Recusal, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704518904575364930042286638.html.
210. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
211. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2011).
212. Id. at 916.
213. Id. at 911.
214. Letter from Anthony D. Weiner, Frank Pallone, Jr., Fortey Pete Stark, &
Christopher S. Murphy, U.S. Cong., to Justice Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court (Feb. 9,
2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/48573148/Letter-to-Justice-ThomasAsking-for-Recusal-In-Health-Law-Case. The letter was also partly spurred by Justice
Thomas’s failure to disclose his wife’s receipt of substantial sums of money from the Heritage
Foundation, a prominent opponent of health-care reform. Id.
215. District courts have split on the constitutionality of the Act. Compare Florida ex rel.
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whether Justice Thomas will indeed recuse himself from hearing the
case.
One could imagine an ex ante proposal that prohibits spouses or
family members from engaging in political or legal activity on issues
likely to reach the judge. And one could certainly argue that the
public can doubt the impartiality of a judge whose spouse has
publicly participated either in the case itself, or in political activity
surrounding the case. But such ex ante solutions are too draconian
and overinclusive. Therefore, I limit my proposal to ex ante
regulation of judicial conduct and judicial elections; familial speech
or behavior should be excluded from regulation.
1. (Non)history of recusal procedure
An astute reader may have noticed something lacking in the
historical discussion in Part II: there was no mention of recusal
procedure either at the state or the federal levels. This absence is not
an omission by the author; rather, it is a reflection of the apathy and
neglect that disqualification procedures have received from
legislatures and bar associations devising disqualification rules as well
as the courts interpreting them. The federal disqualification statute216
does not even provide a procedure for its enforcement. The same is
true of the Model Judicial Code, which, like the federal statute, sets
a substantive standard without a procedure for how that standard is
to be enforced. Judges have generally made up the procedures ad
hoc. One cannot review the history of procedural recusal law because
none exists.
This observation may be surprising given the great deal of public
attention that recusal has received in the last few years as well as the
number of amendments to the substantive recusal rules. Despite that
attention, and despite those amendments, the recusal procedures
have remained stagnant and are by far the least developed aspect of
American recusal jurisprudence. Scholars have observed that
“[u]nlike almost any other area of the law, the process by which
Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL
285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (finding the Act unconstitutional), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), with Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (upholding the Act as constitutional). The split is likely to reach the Court within
the next couple of years.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).

994

DO NOT DELETE

943

10/15/2011 1:15 PM

Making Appearances Matter

judges decide whether to recuse themselves ignores the systems
usually employed to resolve disputes in a fair and impartial
manner.”217
Procedurally, policymakers treat recusal the same way it was
treated hundreds of years ago. The practice of self-recusal, a
procedural quirk that allows the challenged judge to rule on her own
recusal motion, has a long history in the common law. But this
practice was created with virtually no discussion in British cases or
scholarly literature before spreading, again with no critical analysis or
discussion, to Australasia and the Americas. This common law
recusal procedure survives to this day: the general practice in both
state and federal courts is that the judge to whom the motion to
recuse is directed decides whether his or her recusal is necessary.218
And self-recusal is only one of the procedures that hearken back to
Blackstone’s England. Judges rarely write opinions explaining their
recusal decisions, and appellate courts rarely review those decisions
with any vigor.219
Procedures like self-recusal may have made sense when scholars
and lawyers simply assumed that judges sworn to uphold justice
could not and would not be biased.220 But as our understanding of
human nature and the judiciary repudiated that presumption, and as
social scientists uncovered the depths of potential subconscious bias,
legislators and the courts should have reexamined recusal procedures
like self-recusal.221 A system that relies on a sua sponte admission of
bias, or even an appearance of bias, by a judge is bound to fail.
Instead, various courts throughout the nation have adopted different
approaches, resulting in a lack of uniformity.222 Some states permit a

217. Frost, supra note 43, at 536.
218. FLEMING JAMES JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 394 (5th ed. 2001).
219. Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial Disqualification
Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 760 (2010) (“[W]hile federal judges do recuse themselves
in many situations, a judge who does so rarely writes an opinion explaining why.”). Because
few opinions explaining the judge’s recusal rationale are published, the law of recusal is slow to
develop and fails to provide any meaningful guidance to litigants and lawyers about when and
whether disqualification is warranted in any particular case.
220. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361 (“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility
of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”).
221. See Bam, supra note 115, at 78–80 (discussing the importance of tailoring recusal
procedures to the evolving substantive standards).
222. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 238.
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judge whose recusal is sought to decide his own recusal motions,
while others require somebody else to decide such motions.223
More troubling is the fact that most states are silent on the
subject, suggesting that recusal procedure is no more than an
afterthought if it is a thought at all.224 And even when states get
around to considering recusal procedure, the movements generally
have little success. In the last decade, four states sought to amend
their recusal rules to require that a judge other than the judge whose
recusal is sought rule on each motion. 225 All four efforts failed.226
Why is recusal procedure almost entirely ignored by Congress
and state legislatures? One explanation may be that process is viewed
as minutiae, unworthy of legislative attention. After all, procedural
law has been described by some as “painstaking, ministerial, and
ultimately boring.”227 Additionally, Congress has generally been
cautious in regulating judicial procedures in order to protect judicial
impartiality and maintain separation of powers.228 Moreover, it is
(wrongly) assumed that procedural issues should be left to judges,
since that is what judges presumably do best. Surely, one may think,
judges can create recusal procedures that fairly implement the
substantive rules that are in place. Part of the explanation for this
belief lies in the underlying assumption, discussed and challenged in
Part III, that so long as the judge ultimately reaches the correct
recusal decision, nothing else, including the procedure used to reach
the decision, particularly matters.
And even when scholars consider recusal procedure, it is only as a
means to an end—the end being, once again, the correct recusal

223. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c)(5) (West 2006).
224. See William E. Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court from Itself”?: Recusal,
Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2010)
(listing the states that do not set forth any recusal procedure for consideration of recusal
motions).
225. Id. at 772–73.
226. Id.
227. Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1327–28 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
228. Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2008) (“The procedure/merits line also rides
on strong separation of powers concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of
Congress and the courts.”). Scholars have criticized the shortcomings in a system of judicial
self-discipline in other contexts. See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the
Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress
Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439 (2009).
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decision. In other words, when recusal procedure receives any
attention, it is generally part of the critique of the outcomes rather
than the appearances created by the procedures themselves. For
example, other scholars have attacked the practice of self-recusal on
the grounds that judges may not appreciate the presence of
subconscious bias, which leads them to under-recuse.229 To the
contrary, I argue that procedures themselves are the ends—it is in
setting recusal procedures that we should be thinking about
appearances, not hoping that procedures will lead to a substantive
result that will create an appearance of impartiality.
2. The importance of procedure
Why might an appearance-based recusal procedure be more
effective in creating an appearance of an impartial judiciary than the
current outcome-based recusal model? Research by social scientists
holds the key.230 This research supports the notion that the public’s
perception of the judiciary is influenced in large part by whether the
judicial process is perceived to be procedurally fair.231 In fact, several
scholars have shown that even when a court’s substantive decisions
are disfavored, courts retain their perceived legitimacy so long as the
decisions were reached in a procedurally fair manner.232 These

229. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 54, at 1242; Steven Lubet, It Takes a Court, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 228 (2010) (“When it comes to disqualification, it takes more than a
single judge to render a fair decision.”). Of course, judges are at times self-aware of the
possibility of subconscious bias. One of the all-time famous Supreme Court recusals happened
in Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak when Justice Frankfurter
recused himself because of his objection to the playing of radios on public buses. 343 U.S.
451, 454 (1952) (“[N]either the operation of the service [of playing the radio on public
buses] nor the action of the Commission [in] permitting its operation is precluded by the
Constitution.”). In his memorandum explaining the recusal decision, Frankfurter said that his
subconscious hatred of the radio on public buses was so strong that his “unconscious feelings”
could influence his resolution of the dispute. Id. at 466–67.
230. James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural
Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler &
Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621, 621–22 (1991).
Much of the literature in this field focuses on the United States Supreme Court but likely
applies equally to other institutions, including lower-level federal courts and state courts.
231. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 1–2 (1988).
232. Gibson, supra note 230, at 471; Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and
the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and
Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 734 (1994).
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findings are especially true for an institution where the decision
makers are appointed rather than elected and are independent from
the public rather than accountable to their constituents.233
Because procedural fairness is indeed crucial to public
perception, ignoring recusal procedures is a fatal mistake, at least so
long as recusal aims to create an appearance of impartiality. And if
outcomes matter less than process, then leaving aside all
consideration of appearances until the judge makes the final recusal
decision, rather than establishing a proper appearance-based recusal
procedure, misses the boat entirely.
Taking appearances seriously, therefore, means that reforming
the recusal procedures should be a top priority. Only such large-scale
structural changes can create an appearance of fairness and
impartiality. Implementing proper procedures can legitimize judicial
institutions that often operate in an independence-based model. For
example, procedural changes requiring judges to explain their recusal
decisions would foster judicial accountability by giving the public
greater access to—and understanding of—judicial recusal
decisions.234 It would also require judges to be more thoughtful in
decisions they have to justify publicly. Americans have great faith in
the courts in large part because they believe they get a fair shot and a
fair resolution. In the context of recusals this means that we should
create procedures that reduce the appearance of partiality and
reassure Americans that recusal decisions are made in a way that
fosters impartiality and independence.
The question of what specific procedures are necessary to create
the appearance of impartiality is difficult to answer without empirical
studies. However, political scientists have identified four essential
elements contributing to the perception of procedural fairness.235
First, litigants must be treated with dignity and respect.236 Second,
parties must have the opportunity to participate in the process.237
233. John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV.
657, 682 (1994); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
312, 314–315 (1997).
234. Cf. Roberts, supra note 54, at 121 (discussing how the lack of clear recusal
procedures in the United States Supreme Court “permits unaccountability, and increases
doubts about appearances of impartiality”).
235. Tom R. Tyler, What Do They Expect?: New Findings Confirm the Precepts of
Procedural Fairness, CAL. CTS. REV., Winter 2006, at 22–23.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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Third, judges must be trustworthy, and, fourth, the judiciary must
be neutral.238 These recommendations mirror, in some respects,
those of the widely respected Legal Process Theory developed by
Hart and Sacks.239 They identified five central procedural elements:
(1) litigants must initiate disputes, (2) an adversarial process must
allow each party to advance its position, (3) the court must provide a
rationale for its decision, (4) the decision itself must be supported by
a body of law, and (5) the decision maker must be impartial.240
Some have argued that all of the elements identified by Hart and
Sacks should be imported to the American recusal framework in
toto.241 For example, Amanda Frost suggests that because these
tenets of adjudication “serv[e] a vital legitimating function,” they
should all be “incorporate[d] into recusal law.”242 There is some
merit to this proposal; after all, if those are all essential ingredients in
a legal system, why not incorporate them into our recusal
jurisprudence?
But while the five Legal Process tenets identified above are
essential for legitimizing judicial decisions, they may not all be
necessary (or even advantageous) in creating an appearance of
impartiality, and some may even undermine that goal. For example,
the adversarial process is a key part of the American legal system,
allowing both parties an opportunity to present their conflicting
arguments. This party control over case presentation serves a
legitimizing function. But importing the adversarial model into
recusal jurisprudence may in fact harm the appearance of judicial
impartiality by requiring that judges (or their representatives) argue
their cases and attempt to prove to some neutral arbiter that they are
not biased and that their earlier conduct was not improper. Pitting
judges against litigants may in fact work to the detriment of
appearances.243

238. Id.
239. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2001).
240. Id.
241. Frost, supra note 43, at 555–56.
242. Id. at 535.
243. Judges are often frustrated by what they perceive as frivolous recusal requests, and
this problem would be exacerbated if judges were forced to defend themselves in a proceeding
from such charges.
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Therefore, this Article suggests a modified, appearance-based
process theory, whereby those procedures that would appear to a
reasonable person as necessary to create a fair recusal scheme would
be implemented. In other words, rather than asking what procedures
foster confidence in the correctness of the final decision, we should
ask what procedures create an appearance of impartiality. This would
require empirical studies designed to learn which aspects of the Legal
Process Theory matter most for the purpose of appearances. For
example, it seems that Legal Process Theory elements three, four,
and five, which require that an impartial decision maker provide a
rationale for its decision in a written opinion that must be supported
by a body of law, would likely be the crucial elements that must be
imported into recusal procedures. Elements one and two, that
litigants must initiate disputes and an adversarial process must allow
each party to advance its position, however, may or may not be
necessary; this should be confirmed using social science data.
The specific determinations, however, need not, and cannot, be
made at this point. The biggest procedural hurdle to the appearance
of fairness, and one that must likely be addressed first, is the dubious
practice of self-recusal. One of the most important procedural
questions when it comes to recusal is the question of who should
decide recusal motions: the impugned judge, another judge of the
same court, a group of judges, or some other party. The issue of selfrecusal has been perhaps the most criticized aspect of American
recusal rules and procedures.244 When one looks at recusal procedure
from the appearance-based perspective, the flaws inherent in a system
where a potentially biased judge is assigned the task of ruling on her
own recusal motion become immediately apparent. First, the selfrecusal procedure violates the fundamental principle that one should
not be a judge in her own cause. Furthermore, the practice leads
attorneys to abstain from making a recusal motion because of a fear
of judicial retribution. Finally, a judge deciding her own recusal
motion may not acknowledge that she is biased, either because she
does not recognize the bias, because she does not want to admit that

244. See SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 66–67; Leslie W. Abramson,
Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 561 (1994) (“The
appearance of partiality and the perils of self-serving statutory interpretation suggest that, to
the extent logistically feasible, another judge should preside over such motions.”); David K.
Stott, Comment, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through
Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 500.

1000

DO NOT DELETE

943

10/15/2011 1:15 PM

Making Appearances Matter

she is biased, or because she does not want to admit that she
engaged in conduct that created the appearance of bias.
There is another advantage to focusing on appearances while
setting recusal procedures rather than leaving the appearance inquiry
until the very end when the judge makes her recusal decision. It is
the advantage of time—there is an opportunity to think about and
conduct empirical research into what procedures create an
appearance of impartiality, as opposed to when the case is already in
front of the judge. When appearances are considered in creating
recusal procedures, the burden of setting clear, consistent, and
appearance-based recusal procedures will fall to state and federal
legislatures.245 Judges are generally too hesitant to impose
procedures that threaten the collegial relations with their colleagues.
Judges rarely criticize a colleague for being biased or prejudiced,
although they have anonymously acknowledged that their colleagues
(but not them!) may be biased in favor of some litigants, especially
those who helped them get elected.246
Furthermore, considering appearances ex ante, before any case is
actually pending, eliminates the opportunity for judges to consider
the facts of the case in reaching a recusal decision. Once the decision
maker knows the legal issue in question or the identities of the
parties, she may under- (or over-) appreciate whether her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. For example, a judge may be
tempted to refuse to recuse herself in a case involving a cause
important to the judge (for example, tort reform for a conservative
judge or abortion for a liberal one). But if legislatures consider
appearances in advance and implement appearance-based recusal
procedures, it may be more difficult for the underlying facts of the
dispute to infiltrate the recusal decision.
More importantly, just as I questioned the wisdom of allowing
judges to apply the “reasonable person” standard to test the
appearance of their own conduct, judges are likewise not well-suited
to set procedures for determining whether their own impartiality is
in question. This is in part because judges do not have the means
that legislators have to determine which procedures create an
appearance of impartiality. Judges have their own interests in mind,

245. See Raftery, supra note 224, at 766 (discussing the role that legislatures can and
should play in drafting recusal statutes and crafting recusal mechanisms).
246. Pozen, supra note 110, at 290–91.
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and these interests often conflict with creating a recusal procedure
that avoids the appearance of bias. Judges should neither be setting
the recusal procedures nor applying the recusal standards to
themselves. In fact, to the extent that judges do have control over
either the recusal process or the outcome, they are not likely to
appear impartial.247
I conclude this Part by returning to the discussion of the
substantive recusal standard and by reconsidering what the
substantive recusal standard should entail. Earlier, I argued that the
appearance-based standard in place now is not by itself sufficient to
create an appearance of impartiality. But that, of course, is not an
argument in favor of scrapping the standard altogether. Rather, I
believe legislatures must consider the substantive recusal standard
just as they would recusal procedures and determine what standard is
likely to foster an appearance of fairness. One should not assume that
an appearance-based standard is best for appearances. As mentioned
earlier, by lowering the threshold that parties must meet to obtain
recusal, more recusal motions will be filed and public confidence in
the courts may suffer.248 Ultimately, just as the legislatures will need
to determine which recusal procedures create an appearance of
impartiality, they will also need to decide what substantive recusal
standard is best for judicial legitimacy and the reputation of the
courts.

247. One solution would be to create an independent office to review recusal-related
decisions. The 112th Congress has suggested the creation of an Inspector General for the
judicial branch. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 727, 112th
Cong. § 1021 (1st Sess. 2011). Although the office is intended to investigate misconduct and
prevent “waste, fraud, and abuse” within the judiciary, an additional option may be to give it
the power to review recusal decisions by federal judges. Id. § 1023(3). This procedural change
may instill confidence in the public that judges are accountable for their recusal decisions.
248. For example, in a recent West Virginia case, a litigant sought state supreme court
justice Menis Ketchum’s recusal based on statements that he made in his election campaign.
Jessica M. Karmasek, Ketchum Reverses Course, Recuses Himself, W. VA. REC., Sept. 28, 2010,
available at http://www.wvrecord.com/news/230005-ketchum-reverses-course-recuseshimself. After the judge denied the recusal motion, somebody leaked the decision to legal
blogs, creating even greater controversy and drawing negative attention and publicity to the
West Virginia courts. Id. This publicity ultimately led Justice Ketchum to recuse himself not
because he believed his continued presence on the case violated the appearance of impartiality,
but rather because he did not “want [the] Court to be publicly maligned.” Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Recusal lies at the heart of our understanding of the role of the
courts in a democracy. It is meant to ensure judicial independence
and impartiality and to protect the legitimacy of the courts as well as
the reputation of the judiciary. Without reforms to various aspects of
recusal law, public confidence in the judiciary—the primary source of
judicial legitimacy—will continue to wane.
This Article suggests that the long-standing assumption that
recusal completely restores the appearance of judicial impartiality and
public confidence in the courts may need reexamination. It is time to
focus on the circumstances that lead to recusal as well as recusal
procedures. By shifting the focus away from the substantive recusal
standard and the actual recusal decision, we can begin to maximize
the appearance of impartiality on a systemic basis. And by
considering appearance ex ante, before problems arise, we can put in
place ethics rules and recusal procedures that truly legitimize the
judiciary and restore the people’s faith in the fairness of the American
courts.
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